MD 80, Airworthiness

[Federal Register: August 28, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 166)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 49164-49167]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr28au07-11]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 2003-NM-198-AD; Amendment 39-15176; AD 2007-17-18]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-10, -20, -
30, -40, and -50 Series Airplanes; Model DC-9-81 (MD-81), -82 (MD-82),
-83 (MD-83), and -87 (MD-87) Airplanes; and Model MD-88 Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD),
applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-10, -20, -30, -40,
and -50 series airplanes; Model DC-9-81 (MD-81), -82 (MD-82), -83 (MD-
83), and -87 (MD-87) airplanes; and Model MD-88 airplanes; that
requires repetitive inspections and functional tests of the static port
heater assemblies, and corrective actions if necessary. The actions
specified by this AD are intended to prevent an electrical short of the
static port heater from sparking and igniting the insulation blanket
adjacent to the static port heater, which could result in smoke and/or
fire in the cabin area. This action is intended to address the
identified unsafe condition.

DATES: Effective October 2, 2007.
The incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in
the

[[Page 49165]]

regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of
October 2, 2007.

ADDRESSES: The service information referenced in this AD may be
obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Long Beach Division, 3855
Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Data and
Service Management, Dept. C1-L5A (D800-0024). This information may be
examined at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport
Airplane Directorate, Rules Docket, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton,
Washington; or at the FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office,
3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Natalie Phan-Tran, Aerospace Engineer,
Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM-130L, FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft
Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California
90712-4137; telephone (562) 627-5343; fax (562) 627-5210.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal
Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to include an airworthiness
directive (AD) that is applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model
DC-9-10, -20, -30, -40, and -50 series airplanes; Model DC-9-81 (MD-
81), -82 (MD-82), -83 (MD-83), and -87 (MD-87) airplanes; and Model MD-
88 airplanes was published as a supplemental notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM) in the Federal Register on December 20, 2005 (70 FR
75430). That action proposed to require repetitive inspections and
functional tests of the static port heater assemblies, repetitive
inspections of the static port heaters and insulators, and corrective
actions if necessary.

Actions Since Issuance of Supplemental NPRM

We proposed in paragraph (b)(2) of the supplemental NPRM to require
repetitive inspections for proper installation of the static port
heaters and insulation. This proposal was in response to a National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) comment on the original NPRM.
However, we have re-assessed the safety implications of the issue based
on additional information that we received from Boeing. Although we
understand the NTSB's concern, we have determined that the inspections
in paragraph (b)(2) of the supplemental NPRM are not necessary to
address the identified unsafe condition. We have revised paragraph (b)
of this AD to remove the requirement to inspect for proper installation
for the following reasons.
We have concluded that the incorrect stacking of the heater
assembly does not contribute to the heater connector wire damage and is
therefore not a safety concern.
We based our original decision to incorporate a one-time inspection
for incorrect stacking into the original NPRM on the following
statement made to the FAA in Boeing Letter C1-L4L-03-0700, dated June
3, 2003.

Boeing's evaluation included Delta's recommendation to redesign
the `` * * * heater resistance wires * * *'' or heater element to
incorporate larger bend radii. The problems of excessive localized
heating near the bend radii of the element encountered by Delta may
be attributed to heaters that were assembled improperly due to the
AMM error. Delta's statements in its report indicate finding heater
blankets improperly assembled. Boeing concurs with Delta that this
assembly error would cause excessive heating and Boeing also
believes this condition could lead to delamination or other damage
in the bend radii areas.

Then, in the supplemental NPRM, we agreed with the NTSB
recommendation to require repetitive inspections to address any
incorrect stacking that might occur in the future.
After Boeing commented on the supplemental NPRM (see ``Comments''
section below), we contacted Boeing to clarify its comments. At the
same time, in order to better understand the need for a repetitive
inspection for proper installation as the NTSB recommended, we asked
Boeing to provide us with additional information on the cause and
effect of improper installation (incorrect stacking).
We specifically requested that Boeing clarify the definition of
``excessive heating'' and ``other damage in the bend radii areas.''
Boeing confirmed that the bend radii area of the heater assembly is the
internal heating element bend radii, within the laminated elastomer and
is not the bend radii of the connector wire. Based on this statement,
we concluded that the incorrect stacking of the heater as we understood
before does not contribute to heater connector wire damage.
Our evaluation of the additional information has resulted in a
better understanding of ``excessive heating.'' We determined that
improper stack-up of the static port heater might cause the heater
assembly to run longer at the high wattage setting in order to heat the
static plate to the proper temperature. The heater assembly circuit
design limits the absolute temperature that the element can reach.
Thus, the heater assembly cannot reach temperatures significantly
higher than the intended operating temperatures. Additionally, the
heater circuit design incorporates a 310[deg]F thermal fuse. However,
the additional duty time or cycles caused by the improper stack-up
might accelerate the normal aging of the heater assembly. Based on the
above information, our previous conclusion that ``excessive heating''
could damage the heater connector wire is incorrect.
Furthermore, Boeing addressed the improper stack-up of the static
port heater assembly in McDonnell Douglas All Operator Letter (AOL) 9-
2186, dated August 15, 1991. The AOL notified the operators of an
incorrect depiction of the heater/insulator installation in the DC-9
and MD-80 Airplane Maintenance Manuals (AMMs), which were also revised
and corrected in 1991. We are aware of no subsequent reports of
improper stack-up of the static port heater assembly.

Comments

Interested persons have been afforded an opportunity to participate
in the making of this amendment. Due consideration has been given to
the comments received.

Request To Withdraw the Supplemental NPRM

Boeing requests that the supplemental NPRM be withdrawn. Boeing
considers its comments on the original NPRM still valid and offers
these comments on the supplemental NPRM as follows.
Boeing contends that the unsafe condition no longer exists. Boeing
states that the unsafe condition was addressed by Boeing Alert Service
Bulletin MD90-30A023, including Appendix, dated March 14, 2001 (for
Model MD-90-30 airplanes), which was mandated by AD 2001-10-11,
amendment 39-12237 (66 FR 28651, May 24, 2001), and by Boeing Alert
Service Bulletin MD80-30A092, including Appendix, dated March 14, 2001
(for Model DC-9-81, -82, -83, and -87 airplanes, and Model MD-88
airplanes), which was mandated by AD 2001-10-10, amendment 39-12236 (66
FR 28643, May 24, 2001). Boeing states that those ADs require
inspecting the wiring of the primary and alternate static port heaters,
determining if the type of insulation blanket installed is metallized
Mylar, and modifying the insulation blankets if necessary.
Boeing also states that a review of operators' reports indicates
only two events resulted in smoke in the cabin, both on one operator's
MD-88 airplanes, with one report stating a smoke smell was ``evident.''
In response, Boeing issued the service bulletins described previously.
Boeing notes that ``in the

[[Page 49166]]

three years since the release of these service bulletins and the
related ADs, no other static port heater smoke/fire events have been
reported from the entire MD-80/90 fleet.''
Boeing concludes that the unsafe condition no longer exists, and
that the actions in the supplemental NPRM are purely an enhancement.
Therefore, Boeing requests that the supplemental NPRM be withdrawn.
We do not agree with Boeing's request to withdraw the supplemental
NPRM. Although no other static port heater smoke/fire events have been
reported since all metallized Mylar insulation blankets were replaced
with other insulation blankets such as Tedlar, the potential for arcing
from an electrical short of the static port heater connector wire still
exists.
As we previously stated, we requested clarification of this request
to withdraw the supplemental NPRM in an ex parte communication with
Boeing.
Boeing stated that it addressed the potential for fire by removing
material known to ignite easily and propagate fire. Boeing concluded
that the ignition source in the one event in 1999 was of extremely low
energy. The residual risk created by the potential for the low energy
arcing of the wire identified in the event does not, in itself, create
an undue risk. However, Boeing acknowledges the FAA's intent to further
reduce risk by requiring the actions specified in paragraph (b)(1) of
the supplemental NPRM. Boeing recommends that operators perform a
general visual inspection and the functional test (health check) in
accordance with Boeing Service Bulletins MD90-30-026 (for MD-90-30
airplanes) and MD80-30-097 (for DC-9 airplanes).
Therefore, it is Boeing's position that incorporating the
inspections/tests, specified in paragraph (b)(1) of the supplemental
NPRM, into the applicable FAA-approved Maintenance Planning Document(s)
is more appropriate.
In regard to the general visual inspection to verify stack-up
specified in paragraph (b)(2) of the supplemental NPRM, Boeing stated
that stack-up issues are not applicable to the alternate static port
heater assembly. As stated previously, it is Boeing's assessment that
improper stack-up of the primary static port assembly will not increase
the potential for fire as described. Therefore, Boeing disagrees with
the intent of paragraph (b)(2).
We concur with Boeing's recommendation that to further reduce risk,
operators should perform a general visual inspection and functional
test in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin DC9-30-097, Revision 2,
dated May 27, 2005. However, we do not agree that incorporation of the
inspections/tests into the applicable FAA-approved Maintenance Planning
Document(s) is more appropriate than issuance of this AD. We consider
issuance of an AD necessary because ADs are the means to mandate
accomplishment of procedures and adherence to specific compliance
times.
We have determined, based on the above comments, that we will issue
this AD with the requirement of repetitive inspections and the
functional tests, as proposed, in accordance with Boeing Service
Bulletin DC9-30-097, Revision 2, dated May 27, 2005, to identify and
remove marginal static port heaters before they fail and generate
sparks.
Based on the technical and economic information provided earlier,
we do agree with Boeing that inspection of the heater and insulator for
incorrect stacking is not necessary. We have revised paragraph (b) of
this AD accordingly.

Request To Exclude AC (Alternating Current) Hi-Pot (High Potential)
Test

NWA suggests that the AC hi-pot test specified in Boeing DC-9
Drawing SR09340158, Change A, dated May 19, 2005, is not necessary.
Boeing Drawing SR09340158 is referenced as the appropriate source of
service information for doing a functional test of the left or right
primary or alternate static port assemblies in Boeing Service Bulletin
DC9-30-097, Revision 2, dated May 27, 2005 (which is referenced as the
appropriate source of service information for accomplishing the
proposed actions in the supplemental NRPM). NWA states that the high
voltage required for the AC hi-pot test can be destructive to the
heater element, thermostat, and thermal fuse and is not representative
of airplane operating conditions. NWA contends that the insulation
resistance, resistance, and current measurements specified in the
drawing are adequate in assessing the health of the static port heater
blanket.
We do not agree. NWA did not provide data to substantiate any
change to the functional tests specified in Boeing Drawing SR09340158.
In addition, Boeing has confirmed that the AC hi-pot test is necessary
and will not be destructive to the heater element, thermostat, and
thermal fuse. We have not revised this AD in this regard. However,
under the provisions of paragraph (e) of this AD, we may consider
requests for approval of an alternative method of compliance if
sufficient data are submitted to substantiate that such a method would
provide an acceptable level of safety.

Clarification of Alternative Method of Compliance (AMOC) Paragraph

We have revised this action to clarify the appropriate procedure
for notifying the principal inspector before using any approved AMOC on
any airplane to which the AMOC applies.

Explanation of Change to Costs Impact

After the supplemental NPRM was issued, we reviewed the figures we
have used over the past several years to calculate AD costs to
operators. To account for various inflationary costs in the airline
industry, we find it necessary to increase the labor rate used in these
calculations from $65 per work hour to $80 per work hour. The cost
impact information, below, reflects this increase in the specified
hourly labor rate

Conclusion

After careful review of the available data, including the comments
noted above, the FAA has determined that air safety and the public
interest require the adoption of the rule with the changes described
previously. The FAA has determined that these changes will neither
increase the economic burden on any operator nor increase the scope of
the AD.

Cost Impact

There are approximately 1,836 airplanes of the affected design in
the worldwide fleet. The FAA estimates that 1,125 airplanes of U.S.
registry are affected by this AD.
It will take approximately 1 work hour per airplane to accomplish
the general visual inspection for wire damage and functional test, at
an average labor rate of $80 per work hour. Based on these figures, the
cost impact of the inspection for wire damage and functional test on
U.S. operators is estimated to be $90,000, or $80 per airplane, per
inspection cycle.
The cost impact figures discussed above are based on assumptions
that no operator has yet accomplished any of the requirements of this
AD action, and that no operator would accomplish those actions in the
future if this AD were not adopted. The cost impact figures discussed
in AD rulemaking actions represent only the time necessary to perform
the specific actions actually required by the AD. These figures
typically do not include incidental costs, such as the time required to
gain access and close up, planning time, or time necessitated by other
administrative actions.

[[Page 49167]]

Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, ``General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Impact

The regulations adopted herein will not have a substantial direct
effect on the States, on the relationship between the national
Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, it
is determined that this final rule does not have federalism
implications under Executive Order 13132.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this action (1) is
not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866;
(2) is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) will not have a
significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial
number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act. A final evaluation has been prepared for this action
and it is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained
from the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption
``ADDRESSES.''

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

0
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of
the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.


Sec. 39.13 [Amended]

0
2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding the following new airworthiness
directive:

2007-17-18 McDonnell Douglas: Amendment 39-15176. Docket 2003-NM-
198-AD.

Applicability: McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-11, DC-9-12, DC-9-
13, DC-9-14, DC-9-15, DC-9-15F, DC-9-21, DC-9-31, DC-9-32, DC-9-32
(VC-9C), DC-9-32F, DC-9-33F, DC-9-34, DC-9-34F, DC-9-32F (C-9A, C-
9B), DC-9-41, DC-9-51, DC-9-81 (MD-81), DC-9-82 (MD-82), DC-9-83
(MD-83), and DC-9-87 (MD-87) airplanes, and Model MD-88 airplanes;
certificated in any category; as identified in Boeing Service
Bulletin DC9-30-097, Revision 2, dated May 27, 2005.
Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished
previously.
To prevent an electrical short of the static port heater from
sparking and igniting the insulation blanket adjacent to the static
port heater, which could result in smoke and/or fire in the cabin
area, accomplish the following:

Service Bulletin References

(a) The term ``service bulletin,'' as used in this AD, means the
Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Service Bulletin DC9-30-097,
Revision 2, dated May 27, 2005.

Inspection and Functional Test

(b) Within 18 months after the effective date of this AD,
perform a general visual inspection of the left and right primary
and alternate static port heater assemblies for wire damage; and
perform a functional test of the left and right primary and
alternate static port heater assemblies; in accordance with the
service bulletin. Repeat the actions thereafter at intervals not to
exceed 48 months.

Note 1: For the purposes of this AD, a general visual inspection
is: ``A visual examination of an interior or exterior area,
installation or assembly to detect obvious damage, failure or
irregularity. This level of inspection is made from within touching
distance unless otherwise specified. A mirror may be necessary to
ensure visual access to all surfaces in the inspection area. This
level of inspection is made under normal available lighting
conditions such as daylight, hangar lighting, flashlight or drop-
light and may require removal or opening of access panels or doors.
Stands, ladders or platforms may be required to gain proximity to
the area being checked.''

Wire Damage or Heater Failures

(c) If wire damage is found and/or the heater assembly fails the
functional test during the general visual inspection and functional
test required by paragraph (b) of this AD: Before further flight,
replace the damaged or inoperative static port heater assembly with
a new or serviceable static port heater assembly in accordance with
the service bulletin.

Actions Accomplished In Accordance With Previous Issue of Service
Bulletin

(d) Inspections, functional tests, and corrective actions
accomplished before the effective date of this AD in accordance with
Boeing Service Bulletin DC9-30-097, dated February 15, 2002; and
Boeing Service Bulletin DC9-30-097, Revision 01, dated January 24,
2003; are considered acceptable for compliance with the
corresponding actions specified in this AD.

Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

(e)(1) In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, the Manager, Los Angeles
Aircraft Certification Office, is authorized to approve alternative
methods of compliance for this AD.
(2) To request a different method of compliance or a different
compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19.
Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC
applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA
Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local
FSDO.

Incorporation by Reference

(f) Unless otherwise specified in this AD, the actions must be
done in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin DC9-30-097, Revision
2, dated May 27, 2005. This incorporation by reference was approved
by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C.
552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. To get copies of this service information,
contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Long Beach Division, 3855
Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Data
and Service Management, Dept. C1-L5A (D800-0024). To inspect copies
of this service information, go to the FAA, Transport Airplane
Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington; or to the
FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount
Boulevard, Lakewood, California; or to the National Archives and
Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability
of this material at the NARA, call (202) 741-6030, or go to http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html
.


Effective Date

(g) This amendment becomes effective on October 2, 2007.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on August 14, 2007.
Stephen P. Boyd,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. E7-16673 Filed 8-27-07; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

Overcrowded!

Very Light Jets and the National Airspace.

Air Marshal Mental Health Certification

One would think. . .but on the other hand, where would this put Pacino's characters?

See Bruce Schneier's Blog re: interview with Mike McConnell

Interview with National Intelligence Director by El Paso Newspaper.

Cryptome

Pay attention to the legal authorities cited and the argument that the right to travel is not absolute. Excerpt:

" . . . the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that
the right to travel abroad is not an absolute right and that ``no
government interest is more compelling than the security of the
Nation.'' Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981). The Supreme Court
also has stated that the government may place reasonable restrictions
on the right to travel in order to protect this compelling interest.
See id. (reminding that the ``right'' of international travel can be
regulated within the bounds of due process); see also Eunique v.
Powell, 302 F. 3d 971, 974 (9th Cir. 2002) (Fernandez, J.); Hutchins v.
District of Columbia, 188 F. 3d 531, 537 (DC Cir. 1999)."

More on Secure Flight

[Federal Register: August 23, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 163)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 48355-48391]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr23au07-27]


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Part III





Department of Homeland Security





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Transportation Security Administration



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49 CFR Parts 1507, 1540, 1544, and 1560



Secure Flight Plan; Proposed Rule



Privacy Act of 1974: System of Records; Secure Flight Plans; Notice



Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions; Secure Flight
Records; Proposed Rule


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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Transportation Security Administration

49 CFR Parts 1540, 1544, and 1560

[Docket No. TSA-2007-28572]
RIN 1652-AA45


Secure Flight Program

AGENCY: Transportation Security Administration, DHS.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

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SUMMARY: The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA)
requires the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to assume from
aircraft operators the function of conducting pre-flight comparisons of
airline passenger information to Federal Government watch lists for
international and domestic flights. The Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) is currently developing the Secure Flight program
and issuing this rulemaking to implement this congressional mandate.
This rule proposes to allow TSA to begin implementation of the
Secure Flight program, under which TSA would receive passenger and
certain non-traveler information, conduct watch list matching against
the No Fly and Selectee portions of the Federal Government's
consolidated terrorist watch list, and transmit boarding pass printing
instructions back to aircraft operators. TSA would do so in a
consistent and accurate manner while minimizing false matches and
protecting privacy information.
Also in this volume of the Federal Register, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) is publishing a final rule to implement pre-
departure advance passenger and crew manifest requirements for
international flights and voyages departing from or arriving into the
United States, using CBP's Advance Passenger Information System (APIS).
These rules are related. We propose that, when the Secure Flight rule
becomes final, aircraft operators would submit passenger information to
DHS through a single DHS portal for both the Secure Flight and APIS
programs. This would allow DHS to integrate the watch list matching
component of APIS into Secure Flight, resulting in one DHS system
responsible for watch list matching for all aviation passengers.

DATES: Submit comments by October 22, 2007.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by the TSA docket number
to this rulemaking, using any one of the following methods:
Comments Filed Electronically: You may submit comments through the
docket Web site at http://dms.dot.gov You also may submit comments through the Federal eRulemaking portal at http://www.regulations.gov.

Comments Submitted by Mail, Fax, or In Person: Address or deliver
your written, signed comments to the Docket Management System at: U.S.
Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building
Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Ave., SE., Washington, DC
20590; Fax: 202-493-2251.
See SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION for format and other information
about comment submissions.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kevin Knott, Policy Manager, Secure
Flight, Office of Transportation Threat Assessment and Credentialing,
TSA-19, Transportation Security Administration, 601 South 12th Street,
Arlington, VA 22202-4220, telephone (240) 568-5611.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

TSA invites comments relating to the appropriateness,
effectiveness, and any economic, environmental, energy, or federalism
impacts resulting from the required provisions of this rulemaking.
Interested persons may do this by submitting written comments, data, or
views. See ADDRESSES above for information on where to submit comments.
With each comment, please include your name and address, identify
the docket number at the beginning of your comments, and give the
reason for each comment. The most helpful comments reference a specific
portion of the rulemaking, explain the reason for any recommended
change, and include supporting data. You may submit comments and
material electronically, in person, by mail, or fax as provided under
ADDRESSES, but please submit your comments and material by only one
means. If you submit comments by mail or delivery, submit them in two
copies, in an unbound format, no larger than 8.5 by 11 inches, suitable
for copying and electronic filing.
If you want TSA to acknowledge receipt of comments submitted by
mail, include with your comments a self-addressed, stamped postcard on
which the docket number appears. We will stamp the date your comments
were received on the postcard and mail it to you.
TSA will file in the public docket all comments received by TSA,
except for comments containing confidential information and sensitive
security information (SSI).\1\ TSA will consider all comments received
on or before the closing date for comments and will consider comments
filed late to the extent practicable. The docket is available for
public inspection before and after the comment closing date.
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\1\ ``Sensitive Security Information'' or ``SSI'' is information
obtained or developed in the conduct of security activities, the
disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of
privacy, reveal trade secrets or privileged or confidential
information, or be detrimental to the security of transportation.
The protection of SSI is governed by 49 CFR part 1520.
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Handling of Confidential or Proprietary Information and Sensitive
Security Information (SSI) Submitted in Public Comments

Do not submit comments that include trade secrets, confidential
commercial or financial information, or SSI to the public regulatory
docket. Please submit such comments separately from other comments on
the rulemaking. Comments containing this type of information should be
appropriately marked as containing such information and submitted by
mail to the address listed in FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section.
Upon receipt of such comments, TSA will not place the comments in
the public docket and will handle them in accordance with applicable
safeguards and restrictions on access. TSA will hold them in a separate
file to which the public does not have access, and place a note in the
public docket that TSA has received such materials from the commenter.
If TSA receives a request to examine or copy this information, TSA will
treat it as any other request under the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552) and the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS)
FOIA regulation found in 6 CFR part 5.

Reviewing Comments in the Docket

Please be aware that anyone is able to search the electronic form
of all comments received into any of our dockets by the name of the
individual submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted
on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may
review the applicable Privacy Act Statement published in the Federal
Register on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477), or you may visit http://dms.dot.gov
.

You may review the comments in the public docket by visiting the
Dockets Office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except
Federal holidays. The Dockets Office is located

[[Page 48357]]

in the West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, at the Department of
Transportation address, previously provided under ADDRESSES. Also, you
may review public dockets on the Internet at http://dms.dot.gov.


Availability of Rulemaking Document

You can get an electronic copy using the Internet by--
(1) Searching the Department of Transportation's electronic Docket
Management System (DMS) Web page (http://dms.dot.gov/search); (2) Accessing the Government Printing Office's Web page at http://

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html; or

(3) Visiting TSA's Security Regulations Web page at http://www.tsa.gov
and accessing the link for ``Research Center'' at the top

of the page.
In addition, copies are available by writing or calling the
individual in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section. Make sure to
identify the docket number of this rulemaking.

Abbreviations and Terms Used in This Document

APIS--Advance Passenger Information System
ATSA--Aviation and Transportation Security Act
AOIP--Aircraft Operator Implementation Plan
CBP--U.S. Customs and Border Protection
DHS--Department of Homeland Security 2005 DHS Appropriations Act--
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2005
2007 DHS Appropriations Act--Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, 2007
DHS TRIP--Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry
Program
FBI--Federal Bureau of Investigation
FOIA--Freedom of Information Act
GAO--Government Accountability Office
HSPD--Homeland Security Presidential Directive
IATA--International Air Transport Association
IRTPA--Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
PNR--Passenger Name Record
PRI--Passenger Resolution Information
PIA--Privacy Impact Assessment
SFPD--Secure Flight Passenger Data
SSI--Sensitive Security Information
SORN--System of Records Notice
TSA--Transportation Security Administration
TSC--Terrorist Screening Center
TSDB--Terrorist Screening Database

Outline of Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

I. Background
A. Current Watch List Matching
1. Watch List Matching for Domestic Flights
2. Watch List Matching for International Flights
B. Secure Flight Program Summary
C. Implementation Stages of Secure Flight
1. Implementation of Secure Flight for Domestic Flights
2. Implementation of Secure Flight for International Flights
D. Privacy Documents
E. Secure Flight Testing and Information Collection Requirements
1. Secure Flight Testing
2. Information Collection Requirements
F. The Watch List Matching Process Under Secure Flight
G. Operational Testing of Secure Flight
H. Proposed Compliance Schedule
I. Additional Issues Under Consideration and Open to Public
Comment
1. Data Elements
2. Identification Requirements
J. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act
II. Section-by-Section Analysis
III. Regulatory Analyses
A. Paperwork Reduction Act
B. Regulatory Impact Analyses
1. Regulatory Evaluation Summary
2. Executive Order 12866 Assessment
3. Regulatory Flexibility Act Assessment
4. International Trade Impact Assessment
5. Unfunded Mandates Assessment
C. Executive Order 13132, Federalism
D. Environmental Analysis
E. Energy Impact Analysis
List of Subjects
The Proposed Amendments

I. Background

TSA performs passenger and baggage screening at the Nation's
commercial airports.\2\ Aircraft operators currently supplement this
security screening by performing passenger watch list matching using
the Federal No Fly and Selectee Lists, as required under security
directives that TSA issued following the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001. Aircraft operators also conduct this watch list matching
process for non-traveling individuals authorized to enter the sterile
area \3\ of an airport in order to escort a passenger or for some other
purpose approved by TSA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\2\ See the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA)
(Pub. L. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597, Nov. 19, 2001).
\3\ ``Non-traveling individual'' would be defined in this Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking as an individual to whom a covered aircraft
operator or covered airport operator seeks to issue an authorization
to enter the sterile area of an airport in order to escort a minor
or a passenger with disabilities or for some other purpose permitted
by TSA. It would not include employees or agents of airport or
aircraft operators or other individuals whose access to a sterile
area is governed by another TSA regulation or security directive.
Proposed 49 CFR 1560.3.
``Sterile area'' is defined as a portion of airport defined in
the airport security program that provides passengers access to
boarding aircraft and to which the access generally is controlled by
TSA, or by an aircraft operator under part 1544 of this chapter or a
foreign air carrier under part 1546 of this chapter, through the
screening of persons and property. 49 CFR 1540.5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
(IRTPA) requires TSA to assume from air carriers the comparison of
passenger information to the automatic Selectee and No Fly Lists and to
utilize all appropriate records in the consolidated and integrated
watch list that the federal government maintains.\4\ The final report
of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
(9/11 Commission Report) recommends that the watch list matching
function ``should be performed by TSA and it should utilize the larger
set of watch lists maintained by the Federal Government.'' See 9/11
Commission Report at 393.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\4\ Pub. L. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638, Dec. 17, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Consequently, pursuant to Sec. 4012(a) of the IRTPA, TSA is
issuing this NPRM to propose implementation of the Secure Flight
program. Under the program, TSA would receive passenger and certain
non-traveler information from aircraft operators, conduct watch list
matching, and transmit watch list matching results back to aircraft
operators.
The purpose of the Secure Flight program is to assume the watch
list matching function from aircraft operators and to more effectively
and consistently prevent certain known or suspected terrorists from
boarding aircraft where they may jeopardize the lives of passengers and
others. The program is designed to better focus enhanced passenger
screening efforts on individuals likely to pose a threat to civil
aviation, and to facilitate the secure and efficient travel of the vast
majority of the traveling public by distinguishing them from
individuals on the watch list.
In general, the Secure Flight program would compare passenger
information only to the No Fly and Selectee List components of the
Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), which contains the Federal
Government's consolidated terrorist watch list, maintained by the
Terrorist Screening Center (TSC).\5\ However, as recommended by the 9/
11

[[Page 48358]]

Commission, TSA may use ``the larger set of watch lists maintained by
the Federal Government,'' when warranted by security considerations.
For example, TSA may learn that flights on a particular route may be
subject to increased security risk. If this happens, TSA may decide to
compare passenger information on some or all of the flights on that
route against the full TSDB or other government databases, such as
intelligence or law enforcement databases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\5\ The TSC was established by the Attorney General in
coordination with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Defense. The
Attorney General, acting through the Director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI), established the TSC in support of Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD-6), dated September 16,
2003, which required the Attorney General to establish an
organization to consolidate the Federal Government's approach to
terrorism screening and provide for the appropriate and lawful use
of terrorist information in screening processes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

This proposed rule would affect covered flights operated by U.S.
aircraft operators that are required to have a full program under 49
CFR 1544.101(a), and covered flights operated by foreign air carriers
that are required to have a security program under 49 CFR 1546.101(a)
or (b). These aircraft operators generally are the passenger airlines
that offer scheduled and public charter flights from commercial
airports. This proposed rule refers to them as ``covered U.S. aircraft
operators'' and ``covered foreign air carriers'' respectively, and
``covered aircraft operators'' collectively.
The proposed rule would cover all flights conducted by covered U.S.
aircraft operators, as well as all flights conducted by a covered
foreign air carrier arriving in or departing from the United States or
overflying the continental United States (referred to as ``covered
international flights''). TSA is proposing to conduct watch list
matching for overflights in order to protect the United States from
terrorist activity that could occur in its airspace. The proposed rule
collectively refers to the flights conducted by U.S. carriers and
covered international flights that would be regulated under this
proposed rule as ``covered flights.''
IRTPA also requires DHS to assume from air carriers the task of
comparing passenger information for international flights to or from
the United States against the Federal Government's consolidated and
integrated terrorist watch list before departure of such flights.
Initially, CBP will implement this requirement and conduct pre-
departure watch list matching for international flights, through its
Advance Passenger Information System (APIS). APIS is a widely-utilized
electronic data interchange system that international commercial air
and vessel carriers use to electronically transmit to CBP certain data
on passengers and crew members. The former U.S. Customs Service, in
cooperation with the former Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) and the airline industry, developed APIS in 1988. On July 14,
2006, CBP published a notice of proposed rulemaking to require air and
vessel carriers to submit to CBP passenger manifest information before
departure of an international flight to or from the United States and
for voyages from the United States to enable CBP to conduct watch list
matching on passengers before they board an international flight or
depart on certain voyages.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\6\ 71 FR 40035.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In response to a substantial number of comments from the aviation
industry, DHS is proposing a unified approach to watch list matching
for international and domestic passenger flights, to avoid unnecessary
duplication of watch list matching efforts and resources and reduce the
burden on aircraft operators. CBP's APIS Pre-Departure Final Rule
published elsewhere in this issue of the Federal Register and this
notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) are being published jointly to
explain DHS's proposed unified approach. Beginning on the effective
date of the APIS Pre-Departure final rule, CBP will perform the watch
list matching function for international flights to or from the United
States as part of its overall screening of travelers. However, DHS
proposes to ultimately transfer the watch list matching function to the
Secure Flight program. If this approach is adopted, TSA would assume
the aviation passenger watch list matching function for domestic and
international passengers covered by this proposed rule, and CBP would
continue to conduct border enforcement functions under the APIS
program. DHS is establishing one portal through which aircraft
operators will send their passenger information for both programs, with
the goal of streamlining the transmission of passenger information, if
the unified approach is adopted.

A. Current Watch List Matching

1. Watch List Matching for Domestic Flights
Under security directives issued by TSA, covered U.S. aircraft
operators currently conduct pre-flight watch list matching for
passengers on domestic flights using the Federal No Fly and Selectee
Lists. Aircraft operators also apply this process to non-traveling
individuals authorized to enter the sterile area beyond the screening
checkpoint in order to escort a minor or a passenger with disabilities,
or for another purpose authorized by TSA.
Under the current watch list matching process, when an aircraft
operator has a reservation from a passenger with a name that is the
same as, or similar to, a name on the No Fly List, TSA requires the
aircraft operator to notify law enforcement personnel and TSA in order
to determine whether that passenger is in fact the individual whose
name is on the No Fly List. If the passenger is verified as an
individual on the No Fly List, the aircraft operator is prohibited from
transporting the passenger. When an aircraft operator has a reservation
from a passenger with a name that is the same as, or similar to, a name
on the Selectee List, TSA requires the aircraft operator to identify
the individual to TSA for enhanced screening at security screening
checkpoints.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\7\ Individuals may undergo enhanced screening at security
screening checkpoints for a variety of other reasons, such as random
selection or as a result of triggering a metal detector alarm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Watch List Matching for International Flights
Covered aircraft operators also currently conduct watch list
matching for passengers on international flights in the same manner
described above for domestic flights as required in TSA security
directives and emergency amendments to a security program.
Additionally, CBP conducts various activities, including watch list
matching, to screen passengers on commercial international flights
arriving in and departing from the United States through the Advance
Passenger Information System (APIS). CBP conducts such activities in
order to protect the United States from threats of terrorism and to
carry out CBP's border enforcement mission.
Under CBP's APIS regulations (19 CFR part 122), air carriers
departing foreign ports destined for the United States are required to
electronically submit passenger information to CBP no later than
fifteen minutes after the departure of aircraft destined for the United
States and 15 minutes prior to departure of aircraft from the United
States. ``Departure'' currently is defined to be the moment the
aircraft's wheels leave the tarmac. See 19 CFR 122.49. The current
system allows CBP to supplement the watch list matching currently
completed by air carriers prior to boarding. If CBP's screening
identifies that a person on a no-fly list is on an aircraft bound for,
or departing from, the United States, that aircraft will be diverted
from its intended destination.
In this volume of the Federal Register, CBP is publishing a final
rule entitled ``Advance Electronic Submission of Passenger and Crew
Member Manifests for Commercial

[[Page 48359]]

Aircraft and Vessels'' (APIS Pre-Departure Final Rule). This rule,
which becomes effective 180 days after publication, will require air
carriers to provide the passenger information it currently provides to
CBP, but requires air carriers to provide it no later than the time the
flight crew secure the aircraft doors for takeoff.
When commercial air carriers are certified to transmit APIS data
under the pre-departure APIS requirements of the new APIS Pre-Departure
Final Rule, CBP will assume from those carriers the responsibility of
conducting pre-departure watch list matching for international flights
to or from the United States. Once CBP receives the information, it
will complete the watch list matching process and return instructions
concerning each passenger to the covered aircraft operators. Covered
aircraft operators will be required to follow the instructions when
issuing boarding passes to passengers, identifying passengers for
enhanced screening, and allowing passengers to board the aircraft or
preventing them from doing so. If the Secure Flight program is
finalized as envisioned in this proposed rule, it will take over this
watch list matching function for aircraft operators covered under this
proposed rule from CBP.

B. Secure Flight Program Summary

1. Secure Flight Passenger Data
Under the Secure Flight program proposed under this rule, TSA would
require covered aircraft operators to collect information from
passengers, transmit passenger information to TSA for watch list
matching purposes, and process passengers in accordance with TSA
instructions regarding watch list matching results. Under this proposed
rule, TSA would collect Secure Flight Passenger Data (SFPD), consisting
of the information summarized below (and discussed in greater detail in
section I.E.2 ``information collection requirements'' infra).
For passengers on covered flights, TSA is proposing to require
covered aircraft operators to request a passenger's full name, gender,
date of birth, and Redress Number \8\ (if available) or known traveler
number \9\ (if available once the known traveler program is
implemented). Even though covered aircraft operators would be required
to request all of the above data elements from passengers, passengers
would only be required to provide their full name at the time of
reservation to allow TSA to perform watch list matching. They would not
be required by TSA to provide the other data elements to aircraft
operators at the time of reservation. Covered aircraft operators would
be required to transmit to TSA the information provided by the
passenger in response to the request described above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\8\ A Redress Number is a unique number that DHS currently
assigns to individuals who use the DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry
Program (TRIP). Under the proposed rule, individuals would use the
Redress Number in future correspondence with DHS and when making
future travel reservations. The Redress Number is further discussed
in the Secure Flight Information Collection Requirements section
below.
\9\ A known traveler number would be a unique number assigned to
``known travelers'' for whom the Federal Government has already
conducted a threat assessment and has determined do not pose a
security threat. The known traveler number is further discussed in
the Secure Flight Information Collection Requirements section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Covered aircraft operators also would be required to transmit to
TSA passport information, if available. Although not required to be
requested by TSA under this proposed rule, passport information may be
provided by passengers either voluntarily or under other travel
requirements such as CBP APIS requirements if a passenger is traveling
abroad. Additionally, covered aircraft operators would be required to
transmit to TSA certain non-personally identifiable information such as
itinerary information, record locator numbers etc. to allow TSA to
effectively prioritize watch list matching efforts, communicate with
the covered aircraft operator, and facilitate an operational response,
if necessary, to an individual who is on the watch list.
When a non-traveling individual seeks authorization from a covered
aircraft operator to enter an airport sterile area (such as to escort a
minor or assist a passenger with a disability), TSA also is proposing
to require covered aircraft operators to request from the non-traveler
and transmit to TSA, the same information requested from passengers (to
the extent available), as well as certain non-personally identifiable
information, including the airport code for the sterile area to which
the non-traveler seeks access.
The following chart details the information that TSA would require
covered aircraft operators to request from passengers and certain non-
traveling individuals, the information that those individuals would be
required to provide, and the information covered aircraft operators
would be required to transmit to TSA if available:

Proposed Information Collection Requirements for Secure Flight
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Covered aircraft
operators must Passengers and Covered aircraft
request from certain non- operators must
Data elements passengers and travelers must transmit to TSA,
certain non- provide if available
travelers
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Full Name.............................................. X X X
Date of Birth.......................................... X ................. X
Gender................................................. X ................. X
Redress Number or Known Traveler Number................ X ................. X
Passport Information \10\.............................. ................. ................. X
Itinerary Information \11\............................. ................. ................. X
Reservation Control Number............................. ................. ................. X
Record Sequence Number................................. ................. ................. X
Record Type............................................ ................. ................. X
Passenger Update Indicator............................. ................. ................. X
Traveler Reference Number.............................. ................. ................. X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

This proposed rule would not compel the passenger or non-traveler
to provide the majority of the information that covered aircraft
operators request. However, if that individual elected not to provide
the requested information,

[[Page 48360]]

TSA may have insufficient information to distinguish him or her from a
person on the watch list. Accordingly, the individual may be more
likely to experience delays, be subject to additional screening, be
denied transport, or be denied authorization to enter a sterile area.
Without a full name, watch list matching is incredibly unreliable;
therefore the proposed rule would require an individual seeking to
travel on a covered flight or authorization to enter a sterile area to
provide his or her full name, as it appears on the individual's
verifying identity document. The proposed rule would also prohibit
covered aircraft operators from accepting a reservation, or accepting a
request for authorization to enter a sterile area, from an individual
who does not provide a full name.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\10\ Passport information is the following information from a
passenger's passport: (1) Passport number; (2) country of issuance;
(3) expiration date; (4) gender; (5) full name.
\11\ Itinerary information is the following information about a
covered flight: (1) Departure airport code; (2) aircraft operator;
(3) departure date; (4) departure time; (5) arrival date; (6)
scheduled arrival time; (7) arrival airport code; (8) flight number;
(9) operating carrier (if available). For non-traveling individuals,
the itinerary information is the airport code for the sterile area
to which the non-traveling individual seeks access.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. 72-Hour Requirement
Under the Secure Flight proposed rule, covered aircraft operators
would be required to transmit Secure Flight Passenger Data to TSA
approximately 72 hours prior to the scheduled flight departure
time.\12\ Requiring SFPD approximately 72 hours prior to scheduled
flight departure time would support the security mission of the Secure
Flight program and facilitate a streamlined watch list matching process
for aircraft operators and passengers in at least the following ways.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\12\ In the APIS Pre-Departure Final Rule, CBP also encourages,
but does not mandate, all carriers to submit the information up to
72 hours in advance when available, to facilitate clearance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

TSA considered a number of factors in determining that aircraft
operators should submit SFPD to TSA approximately 72 hours before
scheduled flight departure time. TSA reviewed reservation trend
analyses which indicates that, on average, an estimated 90-93% of
travel reservations are finalized and become stable (e.g. not subject
to cancellation or timing changes) 72 hours before the scheduled flight
departure time. Accordingly, TSA determined that it would not be
practicable to require aircraft operators to submit information earlier
than 72 hours prior to flight departure time, as such information would
still be subject to change and would not provide sufficiently reliable
information for TSA to begin watch list matching or engage in any
necessary coordination with law enforcement.
During a standard travel day, TSA estimates that over 2.4 million
passengers use covered aircraft operators for domestic and
international travel (either destined for or departing from the United
States). Although approximately 99% of passenger travel reservations
would be finalized within 24 hours of the departure of any flight, 24
hours would not provide TSA with sufficient time to adequately screen
2.4 million passengers and, when necessary, coordinate operational
responses in the event of identification of a terrorist suspect or as
needed to identify and disrupt a suspected terrorist plot potentially
involving a variety of flights or aircraft operators, foreign or
domestic.
It is important to note that, in any one day, TSA would be
conducting watch list matching on not only the 2.4 million travelers
for one designated travel day, but TSA also would continue to conduct
watch list matching for the 2.4 million travelers for each of the two
days before the date of departure of the flight. In total, over a 72-
hour period, TSA could be conducting watch list matching for up to 7.2
million travelers traveling within a 72-hour period.
Accordingly, TSA is proposing that covered aircraft operators
submit SFPD approximately 72 hours in advance.
Security benefits. A 72-hour period would provide the significant
security benefit of allowing the U.S. government to coordinate an
operational response to a match on a watch list--not only before the
flight departs, but even in advance of the individual's arrival at the
airport. Also, TSA could provide a single watch list matching solution
for both domestic and international flights, because TSA would have the
time to prioritize the domestic and international watch list matching
workload and accommodate last-minute reservations and changes.
Benefits to covered aircraft operators and passengers. The 72-hour
period would also allow TSA to complete watch list matching in time to
allow covered aircraft operators to begin issuing boarding passes to
passengers 24 hours prior to departure. Watch list matching that takes
place immediately prior to the flight's departure, such as that allowed
by CBP's APIS rule, would not allow TSA to communicate with covered
aircraft operators regarding the issuance of boarding passes 24 hours
prior to departure. Additionally, passengers' travel experiences would
be enhanced because TSA would use that time to adjudicate potential
watch list matches and coordinate with other government agencies as
necessary, to resolve as many false positives as possible before such
individuals arrive at the airport or experience delay or inconvenience.
TSA welcomes public comment on this timeframe, as well as on
alternate timeframes, and will consider these comments in the
development of the final rule. As always, comments that include an
analytical justification are most useful.
3. Instructions to Covered Aircraft Operators
TSA would match the SFPD provided by covered aircraft operators
against the watch list. Based on the watch list matching results, TSA
would instruct an aircraft operator to process the individual in the
normal manner, to identify the individual for enhanced screening at a
security checkpoint, or to deny the individual transport or
authorization to enter the airport sterile area. To ensure the
integrity of the boarding pass instructions and to prevent use of
fraudulent boarding passes, TSA would also provide instructions on
placing codes on the boarding passes. Covered aircraft operators would
be required to comply with the TSA instructions.
4. Summary of Requirements
A brief summary of the requirements proposed in this NPRM is
presented below. A detailed explanation of these requirements is
provided in the Section-by-Section Analysis.
Requirements of Covered Aircraft Operators. This proposed
rule would require aircraft operators that conduct certain scheduled
and public charter flights to:
Submit an Aircraft Operator Implementation Plan (AOIP) to
TSA for approval.
Conduct operational testing with TSA.
Request full name, date of birth, gender, and Redress
Number (if available) or known traveler number (if implemented and
available) from passengers and non-traveling individuals.
Transmit Secure Flight Passenger Data for passengers and
non-traveling individuals, in accordance with the aircraft operator's
AOIP, approximately 72 hours prior to the scheduled flight departure
time.
Make a privacy notice available on public Web sites and
self-service kiosks before collecting any personally identifiable
information from passengers or non-traveling individuals.

[[Page 48361]]

Request a verifying identity document at the airport
ticket counter if TSA has not informed the covered aircraft operator of
the results of watch list matching for an individual by the time the
individual attempts to check-in, or informs the covered aircraft
operator that an individual must be placed on inhibited status and may
not be issued a boarding pass or authorization to enter a sterile area.
A verifying identity document is one that has been issued by a Federal,
State, local, or tribal government that contains the individual's full
name, photo, and date of birth, and is non-expired; though a non-
expired passport issued by a foreign government will also be considered
a verifying identity document. This requirement would be in addition to
the current requirement that aircraft operators request all passengers
and non-traveling individuals to provide identification at the time of
check-in or at a screening checkpoint.
When necessary, submit information from the verifying
identity document to TSA to resolve potential watch list matches. In
some cases, TSA may also request that the covered aircraft operator
communicate a physical description of the individual.
Not issue to an individual a boarding pass or
authorization to enter a sterile area or permit an individual to board
an aircraft or enter a sterile area if the individual does not provide
a verifying identity document when requested under circumstances
described above, unless otherwise authorized by TSA.
Prohibit issuance of boarding passes or authorizations to
enter a sterile area to individuals whom TSA has placed on inhibited
status. Prohibit these individuals from boarding an aircraft.
Comply with instructions from TSA to designate identified
individuals for enhanced screening before boarding a flight or
accessing a sterile area.
Place separate codes on boarding passes in accordance with
TSA instructions.
Requirements of Individuals. Individuals who wish to make
a reservation on a covered flight or to access a sterile area must
provide their full names to the covered aircraft operators. This
proposed rule would require those passengers and non-traveling
individuals for whom TSA has not provided watch list matching results
or has provided inhibited status to present a verifying identity
document, in order to board an aircraft or to enter a sterile area.
Individuals also would continue to be subject to the current
requirement that aircraft operators request all passengers and non-
traveling individuals to provide identification at the time of check-in
or at a screening checkpoint.
Government Redress Procedures Available to Individuals.
This proposed rule explains the redress procedures for individuals who
believe they have been improperly or unfairly delayed or prohibited
from boarding a flight as a result of the Secure Flight program. These
individuals may seek assistance through the redress process by
submitting certain personal information, as well as copies of certain
identification documents, to the existing DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry
Program (DHS TRIP). The proposed rule explains the process the Federal
Government will use to review the information submitted and to provide
a timely written response.

C. Implementation Stages of Secure Flight

TSA proposes to implement this rule in two stages. The first stage
would include covered flights between two domestic points in the United
States, and the second stage would include covered flights to or from
the United States, flights that overfly the continental United States,
and all other flights (such as international point-to-point flights)
operated by covered U.S. aircraft operators not covered in the first
stage.
1. Implementation of Secure Flight for Domestic Flights
During the first stage of implementation, TSA would assume the
watch list matching function for domestic flights conducted by covered
U.S. aircraft operators. TSA would conduct operational testing with
each covered U.S. aircraft operator to ensure that the aircraft
operator's system is compatible with TSA's system. After successful
operational testing with a covered U.S. aircraft operator, TSA would
assume the watch list matching function for domestic flights from that
aircraft operator.
2. Implementation of Secure Flight for International Flights
Until TSA implements the Secure Flight program for international
flights by covered aircraft operators, DHS plans for CBP to conduct
pre-departure watch list matching for international flights under the
APIS Pre-Departure Final Rule. This interim approach will allow DHS to
more quickly address the threat of terrorism on flights arriving in and
departing from the United States.
During the second stage of Secure Flight implementation, TSA will
assume the watch list matching function for covered international
flights from CBP. There are a few differences between the two
processes. First, covered aircraft operators would need to request
passenger information at the time of reservation, as required under
this proposed rule. Second, as described below, TSA would utilize
Secure Flight Passenger Data, which requires collection of different
data elements than under the APIS regulations. For its non-watch list
matching functions, which CBP will continue to perform under the APIS
rule, CBP would continue to collect APIS data. Given this, and to
provide a single point of contact, covered aircraft operators can
transmit both APIS data and Secure Flight Passenger Data in a single
transmission to the DHS portal, which will route information to TSA and
CBP as appropriate.
The following tables list the data elements that CBP will collect
under its APIS regulations, and that TSA will collect under the Secure
Flight program.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
APIS regulations
Data elements (international Secure flight
flights) \13\ NPRM \14\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Full Name......................... X X
Date of Birth..................... X X
Gender............................ X X
Redress Number or Known Traveler ................. X
Number...........................
Passport Number*.................. X X
Passport Country of Issuance*..... X X
Passport Expiration Date*......... X X
Passenger Name Record Locator..... X .................
International Air Transport X X
Association (IATA) Foreign
Airport Code--place of
origination......................

[[Page 48362]]


IATA Code--Port of First Arrival.. X X
IATA Code of Final Foreign Port X .................
for In-transit Passengers........
Airline Carrier Code.............. X X
Flight Number..................... X X
Date of Aircraft Departure........ X X
Time of Aircraft Departure........ X X
Date of Aircraft Arrival.......... X X
Scheduled Time of Aircraft Arrival X X
Citizenship....................... X .................
Country of Residence.............. X .................
Status on Board Aircraft.......... X .................
Travel Document Type.............. X .................
Alien Registration Number**....... X
Address While in U.S.--(except for X .................
outbound flights, U.S. citizens,
lawful permanent residents, crew
and intransit passengers)........
Reservation Control Number........ ................. X
Record Sequence Number............ ................. X
Record Type....................... ................. X
Passenger update indicator........ ................. X
Traveler Reference Number......... ................. X
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*If required.
**If applicable.

TSA would require covered aircraft operators to transmit to TSA the
available passenger information required under this proposed rule that
resides in covered aircraft operators' systems. Covered aircraft
operators must submit this information, through the same DHS portal
used for APIS submissions, approximately 72 hours before departure of a
covered flight. Those that elect to transmit all manifest information
required under the Pre-Departure APIS rule at the same time would be
able to send a single transmission to DHS for the Secure Flight and
Pre-Departure APIS programs and would receive a single boarding pass
printing instruction in return. Under the APIS regulations, such
aircraft operators would then be required to validate the information
submitted against the individual's passport or other travel document
and transmit passenger information to DHS only if it is different from
the information previously submitted, no later than 30 minutes prior to
or up to the securing of the doors of an aircraft under CBP's APIS Pre-
Departure rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\13\ All APIS data elements are required.
\14\ Covered aircraft operators must provide data elements
listed for Secure Flight, to the extent they are available.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Covered aircraft operators that do not elect to transmit all
manifest information required under the Pre-Departure APIS rule
approximately 72 hours in advance would submit validated APIS
information no later than 30 minutes prior to or up to the securing of
the doors of an aircraft under CBP's Pre-Departure APIS rule. The
aircraft operator would only receive a boarding pass printing
instruction from DHS after the APIS transmission if the transmitted
APIS data differs from the SFPD that was transmitted 72 hours prior to
departure.
Additionally, for reservations made within 72 hours of scheduled
flight departure time, covered aircraft operators would be required to
transmit Secure Flight Passenger Data as soon as possible. If the
covered aircraft operator is also ready to transmit APIS information at
that time, the covered aircraft operator would be able to send one
transmission for both Secure Flight and Pre-Departure APIS and would
receive one boarding pass printing instruction. If the covered aircraft
operator is not ready to transmit passenger under Pre-Departure APIS at
the same time, the covered aircraft operator would be required to
transmit the passenger information separately for Secure Flight and
APIS.
Covered aircraft operators would use the same portal to transmit
Secure Flight Passenger Data to TSA as they will to transmit APIS data
to CBP. Covered U.S. aircraft operators would not need to undergo
additional operational testing during. . .

[maybe this document is just too big for this frame. . .I'm going to link you to the federal register source and hope you can find the rest of it if you are so inclined:

Rest of it.

Federal Regulatory Brief, Air Worthiness 767, 737

From the Regulatory Brief, dated August 22, 2007, not always available via

http://www.courthousenews.com

Airworthiness directives, Boeing Model 767: Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 767 Airplanes, Federal Register, August 21, 2007, Volume 72, Number 161, Rules and Regulations, Page 46545, 14 CFR Part 39, Docket No. FAA-2006-24952, Directorate Identifier 2006-NM-107-AD, Amendment 39-15157, AD 2007-16-18, RIN 2120-AA64, Final rule.

(This airworthiness directive (AD) is effective September 25, 2007. The Director of the Federal Register approves the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the AD as of September 25, 2007.)

PURPOSE: This airworthiness directive (AD) results from a fire in the forward lower lobe cargo compartment in certain Boeing Model 767 airplanes found shortly after airplane arrival. This AD requires actions intended to detect and correct damage to wires in the forward and aft lower lobe cargo compartments, which could result in a potential short circuit and consequent fire in the forward and aft lower lobe cargo compartments.

SUMMARY: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) adopts a new AD for all Boeing Model 767 airplanes. This AD requires repetitive detailed inspections of the wire bundles, power drive unit (PDU) wiring, and wire attaching hardware, supports, and sleeving located in the forward and aft lower lobe cargo compartments, and corrective actions as necessary.

THIS REGULATION IS NOT FURTHER ANALYZED HERE. IF YOU NEED MORE INFORMATION, PLEASE SEE THE FULL TEXT OF THE REGULATION IN THE LINKED DOCUMENT.


Airworthiness directives, Boeing Model 737-100, -200, -200C, -300, -400, and -500 Series: Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 737-100, -200, -200C, -300, -400, and -500 Series Airplanes, Federal Register, August 21, 2007, Volume 72, Number 161, Rules and Regulations, Page 46559, 14 CFR Part 39, Docket No. FAA-2007-28253, Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-031-AD, Amendment 39-15064, AD 2007-11-07, RIN 2120-AA64, Final rule, correction.
[TEXT]  [PDF]
(This airworthiness directive (AD) remains effective June 6, 2007.)

PURPOSE: This airworthiness directive (AD) corrects an error regarding a confusing compliance time.

SUMMARY: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) corrects a typographical error in an existing AD that was published in the Federal Register on May 22, 2007 (72 FR 28597). This AD applies to all Boeing Model 737-100, -200, -200C, -300, -400, and -500 series airplanes, and requires repetitive detailed inspections for damage of the electrical wire and sleeve that run to the fuel boost pump through a conduit in the fuel tank, and arcing damage of the conduit and signs of fuel leakage into the conduit; replacement of the sleeve with a new, smaller-diameter sleeve; and related investigative and corrective actions, as applicable.

NEED FOR CORRECTION: As published, paragraph (k) of AD 2007-11-07 reads “* * * Thereafter, repeat the detailed inspection at intervals not to exceed 15,000 flight cycles. * * *” The correct term is “flight hours” (not flight cycles), which appears in all other compliance times cited in the AD, as intended.

CORRECTION: 14 CFR Part 39, Section 39.13 is corrected as follows:

In the Federal Register of May 22, 2007, on page 28600, in the third column, paragraph (k) of AD 2007-11-07 is corrected to read as follows:

* * * * *
(k) At the applicable time specified by paragraph (k)(1) or (k)(2) of this AD: Do a detailed inspection for damage of the sleeve and electrical wire of the fuel boost pump; and, before further flight, install a new, smaller-diameter sleeve, and do related investigative and corrective actions, as applicable; in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-28A1263, Revision 1, dated March 19, 2007. Thereafter, repeat the detailed inspection at intervals not to exceed 15,000 flight hours. Accomplishment of the initial inspection, applicable corrective actions, and sleeve installation required by this paragraph terminates the requirements of paragraphs (f), (g), (h), and (i) of this AD.
* * * * *

Refining Capacity

Report.

National ID Card or ELSE!

I SAID you will adopt this standard, or else.

NORAD 9/11 Tapes Live

Weep.

737 Engine Defect Alleged in Crash

Survivors Say Pratt & Whitney
Engine Caused Plane Crash In Peru


CHICAGO (CN) – A defective Boeing 737 engine caused the crash of TANS Peru Flight 204 on Aug. 23, 2005, the survivors of eight crash victims claim in Cook County Court. The families also sue United Technologies Corp. dba Pratt & Whitney, claiming the model 737-200 engine, also known as the Pratt & Whitney Model JT8D-17A engine, “failed to properly and adequately deflect precipitation through the bypass section and away from the engine core … (making the aircraft) incapable of continued safe flight in tropical environments,” that it “contained an engine re-light system that failed to properly energize igniters in the engine in the event of a flameout,” and that it lacked an adequate windshear detection system. The plane crashed on a flight from Lima to Pucallpa. Plaintiffs demand damages for negligence, defective product and wrongful death. They are represented by Donald Nolan.

See complaint via CourthouseNews.com.

787, novel design features

[Federal Register: August 15, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 157)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 45626-45628]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr15au07-3]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 25

[Docket No. NM373; Special Conditions No. 25-360-SC]


Special Conditions: Boeing Model 787-8 Airplane; Composite
Fuselage In-Flight Fire/Flammability Resistance

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final special conditions.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for the Boeing Model 787-8
airplane. This airplane will have novel or unusual design features when
compared to the state of technology envisioned in the airworthiness
standards for transport category airplanes. The fuselage of the Boeing
Model 787-8 series airplane will be made of composite materials rather
than conventional aluminum. While the regulations include flame
propagation standards for some materials commonly found in inaccessible
areas of the airplane, they do not yet incorporate standards for
materials used to construct the fuselage. Therefore, special conditions
are needed to address this design feature. These special conditions
contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator
considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that
established by the existing standards. Additional special conditions
will be issued for other novel or unusual design features of the Boeing
Model 787-8 airplanes.

[[Page 45627]]


DATES: Effective Date: September 14, 2007.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jeff Gardlin, FAA, Airframe/Cabin
Safety, ANM-115, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356;
telephone (425) 227-2136; facsimile (425) 227-1320.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

On March 28, 2003, Boeing applied for an FAA type certificate for
its new Boeing Model 787-8 passenger airplane. The Boeing Model 787-8
airplane will be an all-new, two-engine jet transport airplane with a
two-aisle cabin. The maximum takeoff weight will be 476,000 pounds,
with a maximum passenger count of 381 passengers.

Type Certification Basis

Under provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 21.17,
Boeing must show that Boeing Model 787-8 airplanes (hereafter referred
to as ``the 787'') meet the applicable provisions of 14 CFR part 25, as
amended by Amendments 25-1 through 25-117, except Sec. Sec. 25.809(a)
and 25.812, which will remain at Amendment 25-115. If the Administrator
finds that the applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain
adequate or appropriate safety standards for the 787 because of a novel
or unusual design feature, special conditions are prescribed under
provisions of 14 CFR 21.16.
In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special
conditions, the 787 must comply with the fuel vent and exhaust emission
requirements of 14 CFR part 34 and the noise certification requirements
of part 36. The FAA must also issue a finding of regulatory adequacy
pursuant to section 611 of Public Law 92-574, the ``Noise Control Act
of 1972.''
The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in Sec. 11.19, under
Sec. 11.38, and they become part of the type certification basis under
Sec. 21.17(a)(2).
Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which
they are issued. Should the type certificate for that model be amended
later to include any other model that incorporates the same or similar
novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would also
apply to the other model under Sec. 21.101.

Novel or Unusual Design Features

In-flight fires have originated in inaccessible areas of aircraft
where thermal/acoustic insulation located adjacent to the aluminum
aircraft skin has been the path for flame propagation and fire growth.
Although these insulation materials were required to comply with the
basic ``Bunsen burner'' requirements of 14 CFR 25.853(a) and 25.855(d),
these incidents revealed unexpected flame spread along the insulation
film covering material of the thermal/acoustic insulation. In all
cases, the ignition source was relatively modest and, in most cases,
was electrical in origin (for example an electrical short circuit,
arcing caused by chafed wiring, or a ruptured ballast case).
In September 2003, in an effort to limit use of materials that
sustain or propagate a fire in inaccessible areas, the FAA promulgated
14 CFR 25.856(a), which requires that thermal/acoustic insulation
material installed in the fuselage meet newly developed flame
propagation test requirements. That rule was Amendment 25-111. These
requirements were developed to address a realistic fire threat. We
consider that threat generally applicable to the 787.
Conventional aluminum fuselage material does not contribute to in-
flight fire propagation. As a result, there are no standards that
address in-flight fire safety of the fuselage structure itself. The 787
will make extensive use of composite materials in the fabrication of
the majority of the
Wing,
Fuselage skin,
Stringers,
Spars, and
Most other structural elements of all major sub-assemblies
of the airplane.
As a result of this extensive use of a new construction material,
the fuselage cannot be assumed to have the fire resistance previously
afforded by aluminum during the in-flight fire scenario mentioned
above. These special conditions require that the 787 provide the same
level of in-flight survivability as a conventional aluminum fuselage
airplane. This includes its thermal/acoustic insulation meeting the
requirements of Sec. 25.856(a). Resistance to flame propagation must
be shown, and all products of combustion that may result must be
evaluated for toxicity and found acceptable.

Discussion of Comments

Notice of Proposed Special Conditions No. 25-07-09-SC for the 787
was published in the Federal Register on April 26, 2007 (72 FR 20774).
Two commenters, the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) and an
individual member of the public, responded to the notice. Both
commenters concur with the proposed special conditions but have
additional concerns about composite structures that they feel should be
addressed.
Comment 1. A member of the public commented that a post-crash, fuel
fed fire is a significant hazard that is not addressed in these special
conditions. This commenter cites research conducted on behalf of the
Australian Government that documents potential fire hazards associated
with composite materials--in particular toxicity and smoke. The
commenter noted that the fire penetration resistance of a composite
material alone is not sufficient to determine its overall contribution
to fire safety.
FAA Response: We agree with the commenter that consideration of
post-crash fire safety must include all the factors that influence
survivability, and not just focus on one characteristic. These special
conditions focus on in-flight fire safety, so any issues related to
post-crash fire safety go beyond the scope of these special conditions.
Nonetheless, the FAA is equally concerned with post-crash survivability
and is addressing this issue through separate criteria. In this case,
because there are requirements related to post-crash fire safety in
Sec. 25.856(b), the approach will be via an equivalent level of safety
finding in accordance with Sec. 21.21(b)(1). A summary of this finding
will be available in the FAA Regulatory and Guidance Library at http://rgl.faa.gov/
.

Comment 2. ALPA commented that the effects of moisture ingress must
be addressed for all aspects of composite material integrity.
FAA Response: From the standpoint of flammability, moisture ingress
is not an issue, because moisture will tend to reduce the flammability
of the material. Since these special conditions only concern
flammability resulting from an in-flight fire, the remainder of the
issues go beyond the scope of these special conditions. Moisture is
known to influence properties of composite materials and this concern
is a well documented environmental condition that Boeing will have to
address. In fact, the use of composite materials in aviation is not new
and there is a significant amount of experience with the behavior of
composites over time in service. Advisory Circular 20-107A, Composite
Aircraft Structure, also discusses factors that need to be addressed
when using composite structure.
Comment 3. ALPA also commented that aluminum structure can
dissipate heat using the airflow over the skin, but this may not be the
case for a composite structure because of its different thermal

[[Page 45628]]

conductivity. ALPA believes that this difference must be taken into
account with any in-flight fire safety assessment.
FAA Response: We agree that the heat transfer characteristics of
aluminum influence its response to an in-flight fire, and that a
composite structure will doubtless behave differently. The goal of
these special conditions is to enable continued safe flight and landing
in the event of an in-flight fire that directly impinges on the
fuselage structure. Since these special conditions require Boeing to
show that the composite structure is resistant to flame propagation
resulting from in-flight fire, all the relevant material properties and
performance characteristics of the composite structure will need to be
addressed. This requirement is not a comparison with aluminum
structure. It is a new requirement for composite structure. Since this
is so, the special conditions as written cover the ALPA concern, and
these special conditions are adopted as proposed.

Applicability

As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to the
787. Should Boeing apply at a later date for a change to the type
certificate to include another model on the same type certificate
incorporating the same novel or unusual design features, these special
conditions would apply to that model as well.

Conclusion

This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features
of the 787. It is not a rule of general applicability.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.

The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704.

The Special Conditions

0
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of
the type certification basis for the Boeing Model 787-8 airplane.
0
In addition to the requirements of 14 CFR 25.853(a) governing material
flammability, the following special conditions apply:

The 787-8 composite fuselage structure must be shown to be
resistant to flame propagation under the fire threat used to develop
14 CFR 25.856(a). If products of combustion are observed beyond the
test heat source, they must be evaluated and found acceptable.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on August 6, 2007.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. E7-16020 Filed 8-14-07; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P