List of Radiation Danger Flights

Complete List.

Yo! You're infringing my patent!

E Passport trouble, via courthousenews.com.

Lest we forget. . .

Sept 11 Litigation Wave about to break.

Dept of Homeland Security- Privacy Issues

Use of Commercial Databases.

USAir/Delta merger fall out

from JPMorgan.

Winners and Losers in the USAir/Delta merge

Delta's Frequent Flyers.

Clear!

Verified Identity Pass first out of the gate.

Bruce Schneier's Interview

Cannot be Exported, Classified Info.

Virtually Naked

New Technology can see through clothing.

Grandma waiting in the cell phone lot

Some of them, anyway.

Yale Law vs Dept Homeland Security

Yale Law School's Immigration Clinic sues Dept of Homeland Security under Freedom of Information Act, see the complaint.

SEX! on a PLANE!

Ewwe! Just where were they sitting?

Couple collared for exchanging fluids.

Electronic Frontier Foundation sues Dept Homeland Security

Passenger Name Record Privacy.

Preceived mistreatment of foreigners on US soil

You know, there is this thread of thought in history that one of the reasons we did not use the A bomb on Germany is we knew too many people who lived there, personally.

Government to charge $28 for background check

RegisteredTraveler fee will be $28 for background check.

RFID chip dangers non-existent

If the Americans of the 19th century behaved as many Americans do today, we would still be a nation of farmers, living somewhat like the Amish with their reliance on horses and hand power. This is because an exaggerated aversion to risk shapes discussion (from missile defense to free trade) in ways that the more confident America of the past could not have imagined. New technologies in particular excite this aversion, and Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) leads the pack when it comes to exaggerated concern.

There is no plausible scenario where RFID poses a threat to privacy. The most extreme fears expressed about RFID seem to be based on films like Minority Report, in which an omnipresent state tracks its citizens’ every move. Governments and giant corporations, we are asked to believe, will implant RFID chips into underwear and soup cans, allowing them to invade privacy at will and amass vast amounts of data on individual behavior.

The problem with this scenario and others like it is that they do not make any sense technologically or commercially. A brief review of the technology shows why risk is miniscule. RFID technology involves a tiny radio device that can be attached to an item, person, or animal. The device emits a radio signal that contains a small amount of data – a serial number or other unique identifier and perhaps a few other details. The small tags envisioned for commercial use in particular have very limited capabilities.

Hey, don't look at me, I'm just a science fiction fan.

Promise Keepers

No. . .not that one. . the airlines.

Non Discrimnation on the basis of religious affiliation

Hey, all that is smoke and mirrors, see what we really do when we are attacked. Ask the Japanese immigrants and US Citizens of Japanese ancestry who spent WWII in forced detention in US camps.

SNAKES! on a PLANE!

Pictures TOO GOOD to miss.

Stumbled on this, looking for something else:

Cooperhead.

Flight TRACKS

Track your inbound flight's status.

Air Marshalls removed from flight in DC

Where's your paperwork?

Air Marshalls removed from flight in DC

Where's your paper work?.

Homeland Security's Annual Report to Congress

On Privacy.

Air Carrier, share of domestic market

Piece of the Pie in the Sky.

Air Consumer Rights

Air consumer rights via DOT.

Show him what he won, Ed!

US wins WORST destination contest.

One cannot conform one's conduct

UNTIL s/he knows the RULES.

Papers, please

John Gilmore's testing of the requirement to produce ID to travel.

Wealth Transfer through regulation

Slack = freedom from scrutiny.

UnFREAKING believable

All they need is your frequent flyer number via discarded boarding pass.

GE says RegisteredTraveler $1Billion revenue stream

Spell it with a "B" boys and girls.

Air Travel Consumer Report (how the carriers rank)

Lost Bags/Delays/Cancellations/Dead Animals, etc.

e-passports get mixed reviews

DEFCON demonstrates EU passports can be cloned.

British Woman arrested for files on laptop

About now would be a good time to rename your files, even if you are writing a thriller.

Leading Surveillance Societies in EU & Western World

Leading Surveillance Societies.

The Budapest Declaration

The Budapest Declaration on the ease of Identity Theft facilitated by Machine Readable Passports.

Virus compromises US-VISIT computers

DHS forced to reveal extent of infection through Freedom of Information Act Procedure, via Wired Magazine.

Laptops being seized by customs agents w/o explanation

See Joe Sharkey's Column in the NYTimes for increasing incidence of laptop seziure based on suspect file names on hard drive.

Dirty Old Men

Child Welfare Regulations at British Air.

Mike Boyd's "Where we are now in Airport Security" column on the 9/11 anniversary

Ground Hog Day.

Topics in Aviation (foreign control of US carriers)

Report,2006.See also, Asia/Pacific/Middle East Aviation Outlook Summit, November 2006.

Automated Targeting System as part of Passenger Name Record

[Federal Register: November 2, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 212)]
[Notices]
[Page 64543-64546]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr02no06-51]

=======================================================================
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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Office of the Secretary

[DHS-2006-0060]


Privacy Act of 1974; System of Records

AGENCY: Privacy Office, Department of Homeland Security.

ACTION: Notice of Privacy Act system of records.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: To provide expanded notice and transparency to the public, the
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection
gives notice regarding the Automated Targeting System, which is the
enforcement screening module associated with the Treasury Enforcement
Communications System and was previously covered by the Treasury
Enforcement Communications System ``System of Records Notice.'' This
system of records is subject to the Privacy Act of 1974, as amended (5
U.S.C. 552a).
The Treasury Enforcement Communications System is established as an
overarching law enforcement information collection, targeting, and
sharing environment. This environment is comprised of several modules
designed to collect, maintain, and screen data, conduct targeting, and
share information. Among these modules, the Automated Targeting System
performs screening of both inbound and outbound cargo, travelers, and
conveyances. As part of this screening function, the Automated
Targeting System compares information obtained from the public with a
set series of queries designed to permit targeting of conveyances,
goods, cargo, or persons to facilitate DHS's border enforcement
mission.
The risk assessment and links to information upon which the
assessment is based, which are stored in the Automated Targeting
System, are created from existing information in a number of sources,
including, but not limited to: the trade community through the
Automated Commercial System or its successor; the Automated Commercial
Environment system; the traveling public through information submitted
by their carrier to the Advance Passenger Information System; persons
crossing the United States land border by automobile or on foot; the
Treasury Enforcement Communications System, or its successor; or law
enforcement information maintained in other parts of the Treasury
Enforcement Communications System that pertain to persons, goods, or
conveyances.
As part of the information it accesses for screening, Passenger
Name Record (PNR) information, which is currently collected pursuant to
an existing CBP regulation (19 CFR 122.49d) from both inbound and
outbound travelers through the carrier upon which travel occurs, is
stored in the Automated Targeting System. PNR is comprised of data
which carriers collect as a matter of their usual business practice in
negotiating and arranging the travel transaction.
As noted above, this system of records notice does not identify or
create any new collection of information, rather DHS is providing
additional notice and transparency of the functionality of these
systems.

DATES: The new system of records will be effective December 4, 2006,
unless comments are received that result in a contrary determination.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by docket number, by one
of the following methods:
Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov.

Follow the instructions for submitting comments via docket number DH6-
2006-0060.
Fax: 202-572-8727.
Mail: Comments by mail are to be addressed to the Border
Security Regulations Branch, Office of Regulations and Rulings, Bureau
of Customs and Border Protection, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW. (Mint
Annex), Washington, DC 20229. Comments by mail may also be submitted to
Hugo Teufel III, Chief Privacy Officer, Department of Homeland
Security, 601 S. 12th Street, Arlington, VA 22202-4220.
Instructions: All submissions received must include the
agency name and docket number for this rulemaking. All comments
received will be posted without change to http://www.regulations.gov,

including any personal information provided.
Docket: For access to the docket to read background
documents or comments received go to http://www.regulations.gov.

Submitted comments may also be inspected during regular business days
between the hours of 9 a.m. and 4:30 p.m. at the Regulations Branch,
Office of Regulations and Rulings, Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection, 799 9th Street, NW., 5th Floor, Washington, DC.
Arrangements to inspect submitted comments should be made in advance by
calling Mr. Joseph Clark at (202) 572-8768.

[[Page 64544]]


FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For general questions please contact:
Laurence E. Castelli (202-572-8790), Chief, Privacy Act Policy and
Procedures Branch, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, Office of
Regulations & Rulings, Mint Annex, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW.,
Washington, DC 20229. For privacy issues please contact: Hugo Teufel
III (571-227-3813), Chief Privacy Officer, Privacy Office, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC 20528.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Bureau of Customs and Border Protection
(CBP), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has traditionally relied
on computerized cargo screening processes to aid the CBP inspection
workforce in the cargo release process. Separately, CBP has used the
advance submission of traveler information to aid in screening
travelers to facilitate its border enforcement mission. The Automated
Targeting System (ATS) associates information obtained from CBP's
cargo, travelers, and border enforcement systems with a level of risk
posed by each item and person as determined through the rule based
query of the cargo or personal information accessed by ATS.
The Privacy Act embodies fair information principles in a statutory
framework governing the means by which the United States Government
collects, maintains, uses, and disseminates personally identifiable
information. The Privacy Act applies to information that is maintained
in a ``system of records.'' A ``system of records'' is a group of any
records under the control of an agency from which information is
retrieved by the name of the individual or by some identifying number,
symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual. In
the Privacy Act, an individual is defined to encompass United States
citizens and legal permanent residents. ATS involves the collection and
creation of information that is maintained in a system of records.
Previously, this information was covered by the Treasury
Enforcement Communications System (TECS) system of records notice, as
ATS is a functional module associated with the environment of TECS. ATS
is employed as an analytical tool to enhance CBP screening and
targeting capabilities by permitting query-based comparisons of
different data modules associated with the TECS system, as well as
comparisons with data sets from sources outside of TECS. As part of
DHS's updating of its system of records notices and in an effort to
provide more detailed information to the traveling public and trade
community, CBP has determined that ATS should be noticed as a separate
system of records, giving greater visibility into its targeting and
screening efforts.
The Privacy Act requires each agency to publish in the Federal
Register a description denoting the type and character of each system
of records that the agency maintains, and the routine uses that are
contained in each system in order to make agency recordkeeping
practices transparent, to notify individuals regarding the uses to
which personally identifiable information is put, and to assist the
individual to more easily find such files within the agency.
DHS is hereby publishing a description of the system of records
referred to as the Automated Targeting System. In accordance with 5
U.S.C. 552a(r), a report concerning this record system has been sent to
the Office of Management and Budget and to the Congress.
DHS/CBP-006

SYSTEM NAME:
Automated Targeting System (ATS)--DHS/CBP.

SYSTEM LOCATION:
This computer database is located at the Bureau of Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) National Data Center in Washington, DC.
Computer terminals are located at customhouses, border ports of entry,
airport inspection facilities under the jurisdiction of the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) and other locations at which DHS authorized
personnel may be posted to facilitate DHS's mission.

CATEGORIES OF INDIVIDUALS COVERED BY THE SYSTEM:
A. Persons seeking to enter or exit the United States;
B. Persons who engage in any form of trade or other commercial
transaction related to the importation or exportation of merchandise;
C. Persons who are employed in any capacity related to the transit
of merchandise intended to cross the United States border; and
D. Persons who serve as operators, crew, or passengers on any
vessel, vehicle, aircraft, or train who enters or exits the United
States.

CATEGORIES OF RECORDS IN THE SYSTEM:
ATS builds a risk assessment for cargo, conveyances, and travelers
based on criteria and rules developed by CBP. ATS maintains the
resulting assessment together with a record of which rules were used to
develop the assessment. With the exception of PNR information,
discussed below, ATS maintains a pointer or reference to the underlying
records from other systems that resulted in a particular assessment.
This assessment and related rules history associated with developing a
risk assessment for an individual are maintained for up to forty years
to support ongoing targeting requirements.
ATS--P (Automated Targeting System--Passenger), a component of ATS,
maintains the PNR information obtained from commercial carriers for
purposes of assessing the risk of international travelers. PNR may
include such items as:
PNR record locator code,
Date of reservation,
Date(s) of intended travel,
Name,
Other names on PNR,
Number of travelers on PNR,
Seat information,
Address,
All forms of payment information,
Billing address,
Contact telephone numbers,
All travel itinerary for specific PNR,
Frequent flyer information,
Travel agency,
Travel agent,
Code share PNR information,
Travel status of passenger,
Split/Divided PNR information,
Identifiers for free tickets,
One-way tickets,
E-mail address,
Ticketing field information,
Automated Ticketing Fare Quote (ATFQ) fields,
General remarks,
Ticket number,
Seat number,
Date of ticket issuance,
Any collected APIS information,
No show history,
Number of bags,
Bag tag numbers,
Go show information,
Number of bags on each segment,
Other Supplementary information (OSI),
Special Services information (SSI),
Special Services Request (SSR),
Voluntary/involuntary upgrades,
Received from information, and
All historical changes to the PNR
Not all carriers maintain the same sets of information for PNR.

AUTHORITY FOR MAINTENANCE OF THE SYSTEM:
19 U.S.C. 482, 1461, 1496, and 1581-1582, 8 U.S.C. 1357, Title VII
of Public Law 104-208, and 49 U.S.C. 44909.

Purpose(s):
(a) To perform targeting of individuals, including passengers and

[[Page 64545]]

crew, focusing CBP resources by identifying persons who may pose a risk
to border security, may be a terrorist or suspected terrorist, or may
otherwise be engaged in activity in violation of U.S. law;
(b) To perform targeting of conveyances and cargo to focus CBP's
resources for inspection and examination and enhance CBP's ability to
identify potential violations of U.S. law, possible terrorist threats,
and other threats to border security; and
(c) To assist in the enforcement of the laws enforced or
administered by DHS, including those related to counterterrorism.

ROUTINE USES OF RECORDS MAINTAINED IN THE SYSTEM, INCLUDING CATEGORIES
OF USERS AND THE PURPOSES OF SUCH USES:
In addition to those disclosures generally permitted under 5 U.S.C.
552a(b) of the Privacy Act, all or a portion of the records or
information contained in this system may be disclosed outside DHS as a
routine use pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(b)(3) as follows:
A. To appropriate Federal, state, local, tribal, or foreign
governmental agencies or multilateral governmental organizations
responsible for investigating or prosecuting the violations of, or for
enforcing or implementing, a statute, rule, regulation, order, or
license, where CBP believes the information would assist enforcement of
civil or criminal laws;
B. To appropriate Federal, state, local, tribal, or foreign
governmental agencies maintaining civil, criminal, or other relevant
enforcement information or other pertinent information, which has
requested information relevant or necessary to the requesting agency's
hiring or retention of an individual, or issuance of a security
clearance, license, contract, grant, or other benefit and disclosure is
appropriate to the proper performance of the official duties of the
person making the disclosure;
C. To a court, magistrate, or administrative tribunal in the course
of presenting evidence, including disclosures to opposing counsel or
witnesses in the course of civil discovery, litigation, or settlement
negotiations, or in response to a subpoena, or in connection with
criminal law proceedings;
D. To third parties during the course of a law enforcement
investigation to the extent necessary to obtain information pertinent
to the investigation, provided disclosure is appropriate to the proper
performance of the official duties of the officer making the
disclosure;
E. To an agency, organization, or individual for the purposes of
performing audit or oversight operations as authorized by law;
F. To a Congressional office, for the record of an individual in
response to an inquiry from that Congressional office made at the
request of the individual to whom the record pertains;
G. To contractors, grantees, experts, consultants, students, and
others performing or working on a contract, service, grant, cooperative
agreement, or other assignment for the Federal government, when
necessary to accomplish an agency function related to this system of
records, in compliance with the Privacy Act of 1974, as amended;
H. To an organization or individual in either the public or private
sector, either foreign or domestic, where there is a reason to believe
that the recipient is or could become the target of a particular
terrorist activity or conspiracy, to the extent the information is
relevant to the protection of life or property and disclosure is
appropriate to the proper performance of the official duties of the
person making the disclosure;
I. To the United States Department of Justice (including United
States Attorney offices) or other Federal agency conducting litigation
or in proceedings before any court, adjudicative or administrative
body, when it is necessary to the litigation and one of the following
is a party to the litigation or has an interest in such litigation: (a)
DHS, or (b) any employee of DHS in his/her official capacity, or (c)
any employee of DHS in his/her individual capacity where DOJ or DHS has
agreed to represent said employee, or (d) the United States or any
agency thereof;
J. To the National Archives and Records Administration or other
Federal government agencies pursuant to records management inspections
being conducted under the authority of 44 U.S.C. 2904 and 2906;
K. To appropriate Federal, state, local, tribal, or foreign
governmental agencies, if necessary to obtain information relevant to a
DHS decision concerning the hiring or retention of an employee, the
issuance of a security clearance, the reporting of an investigation of
an employee, the letting of a contract, or the issuance of a license,
grant or other benefit and disclosure is appropriate to the proper
performance of the official duties of the individual making the
disclosure;
L. To appropriate Federal, State, local, tribal, or foreign
governmental agencies or multilateral governmental organizations, for
purposes of assisting such agencies or organizations in preventing
exposure to or transmission of a communicable or quarantinable disease
or for combatting other significant public health threats;
M. To Federal and foreign government intelligence or
counterterrorism agencies or components where CBP becomes aware of an
indication of a threat or potential threat to national or international
security, or where such use is to assist in anti-terrorism efforts and
disclosure is appropriate to the proper performance of the official
duties of the person making the disclosure;
N. To appropriate Federal, State, local, tribal, or foreign
governmental agencies or multilateral governmental organizations where
CBP is aware of a need to utilize relevant data for purposes of testing
new technology and systems designed to enhance border security or
identify other violations of law;
O. To appropriate agencies, entities, and persons when (1) it is
suspected or confirmed that the security or confidentiality of
information in the system of records has been compromised; (2) CBP has
determined that as a result of the suspected or confirmed compromise
there is a risk of harm to economic or property interests, identity
theft or fraud, or harm to the security or integrity of this system or
other systems or programs (whether maintained by CBP or another agency
or entity) that rely upon the compromised information; and (3) the
disclosure is made to such agencies, entities, and persons when
reasonably necessary to assist in connection with the CBP's efforts to
respond to the suspected or confirmed compromise and prevent, minimize,
or remedy such harm.

POLICIES AND PRACTICES FOR STORING, RETRIEVING, ACCESSING, RETAINING,
AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS IN THE SYSTEM:
STORAGE:
The data is stored electronically at the National Data Center for
current data and offsite at an alternative data storage facility for
historical logs and system backups.

RETRIEVABILITY:
The data is retrievable by name or personal identifier from an
electronic database.

SAFEGUARDS:
All records are protected from unauthorized access through
appropriate administrative, physical, and technical safeguards. These
safeguards include all of the following: restricting access to those
with a ``need to know''; using locks, alarm devices,

[[Page 64546]]

and passwords; compartmentalizing databases; auditing software; and
encrypting data communications.
ATS also monitors source systems for changes to the source data.
The system manager, in addition, has the capability to maintain system
back-ups for the purpose of supporting continuity of operations and the
discrete need to isolate and copy specific data access transactions for
the purpose of conducting security incident investigations. ATS
information is secured in full compliance with the requirements of the
DHS IT Security Program Handbook. This handbook establishes a
comprehensive information security program.
Access to the risk assessment results and related rules is
restricted to a limited number of authorized government personnel who
have gone through extensive training on the appropriate use of this
information and CBP policies, including for security and privacy. These
individuals are trained to review the risk assessments and background
information to identify individuals who may likely pose a risk. To
ensure that ATS is being accessed and used appropriately, audit logs
are created and reviewed routinely by CBP's Office of Internal Affairs.

RETENTION AND DISPOSAL:
The information initially collected in ATS is used for entry
screening purposes. Records in this system will be retained and
disposed of in accordance with a records schedule to be approved by the
National Archives and Records Administration. ATS both collects
information directly, and derives other information from various
systems. To the extent information is collected from other systems,
data is retained in accordance with the record retention requirements
of those systems.
The retention period for data specifically maintained in ATS will
not exceed forty years at which time it will be deleted from ATS. Up to
forty years of data retention may be required to cover the potentially
active lifespan of individuals associated with terrorism or other
criminal activities. The touchstone for data retention, however, is its
relevance and utility. Accordingly, CBP will regularly review the data
maintained in ATS to ensure its continued relevance and usefulness. If
no longer relevant and useful, CBP will delete the information. All
risk assessments need to be maintained because the risk assessment for
individuals who are deemed low risk will be relevant if their risk
profile changes in the future, for example, if terrorist associations
are identified. Additionally, certain data collected directly by ATS
may be subject to shorter retention limitations pursuant to separate
arrangements. The adoption of shorter retention periods may not be
publicly disclosed if DHS concludes that disclosure would affect
operational security, for example by giving terrorism suspects the
certainty that their past travel patterns would no longer be known to
U.S. authorities.

SYSTEM MANAGER(S) AND ADDRESS:
Executive Director, National Targeting and Security, Office of
Field Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Ronald Reagan
Building and Director, Targeting and Analysis, Systems Program Office,
Office of Information Technology, U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

NOTIFICATION PROCEDURE:
Generally, this system of records may not be accessed for purposes
of determining if the system is a record pertaining to a particular
individual. (See 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4)(G) and (f)(1)).
General inquiries regarding ATS may be directed to the Customer
Satisfaction Unit, Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, Room 5.5-C, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, DC
20229 (phone: (202) 344-1850 and fax: (202) 344-2791).

RECORD ACCESS PROCEDURES:
Generally, this system of records may not be accessed under the
Privacy Act for the purpose of inspection. The majority of this system
is exempted from this requirement pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) and
(k)(2).
General inquiries regarding ATS may be directed to the Customer
Satisfaction Unit, Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, Room 5.5-C, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, DC
20229.
Requests should conform to the requirements of 6 CFR Part 5,
Subpart B, which provides the rules for requesting access to Privacy
Act records maintained by DHS. The envelope and letter should be
clearly marked ``Privacy Act Access Request.'' The request should
include a general description of the records sought and must include
the requester's full name, current address, and date and place of
birth. The request must be signed and either notarized or submitted
under penalty of perjury.

CONTESTING RECORD PROCEDURES:
Since this system of records may not be accessed, generally, for
purposes of determining if the system contains a record pertaining to a
particular individual and those records, if any, cannot be inspected,
the system may not be accessed under the Privacy Act for the purpose of
contesting the content of the record.

RECORD SOURCE CATEGORIES:
The system contains information derived from other law enforcement
systems operated by DHS and other government agencies, which collected
the underlying data from individuals and public entities directly.
In addition, the system contains information collected from
carriers that operate vessels, vehicles, aircraft, and/or trains that
enter or exit the United States.

EXEMPTIONS CLAIMED FOR THE SYSTEM:
Pursuant to 31 CFR 1.36 pertaining to the Treasury Enforcement
Communications System, the Automated Targeting System, which was
previously covered by the Treasury Enforcement Communications System
(TECS) system of records notice and associated with the below
exemptions, records and information in this system are exempt from 5
U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d)(1), (d)(2), (d)(3), (d)(4), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G),
(H), and (I), and (f) of the Privacy Act pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
552a(j)(2) and (k)(2). DHS intends to review these exemptions and, if
warranted, issue a new set of exemptions specific to ATS within ninety
(90) days of the publication of this notice.

Dated: October 27, 2006.
Hugo Teufel III,
Chief Privacy Officer.
[FR Doc. 06-9026 Filed 10-30-06; 3:31 pm]

BILLING CODE 4410-10-P

TSA notices interested parties - extending RegisteredTraveler Invitation

[Federal Register: November 3, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 213)]
[Notices]
[Page 64732-64733]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr03no06-98]

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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Transportation Security Administration


Extension of Agency Information Collection Activity Under OMB
Review: Registered Traveler Pilot (RT) Pilot Program; Satisfaction and
Effectiveness Measurement Data Collection Instruments

AGENCY: Transportation Security Administration, DHS.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This notice announces that the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) has forwarded the Information Collection Request
(ICR) abstracted below to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for
review and approval of an extension of the currently approved
collection under the Paperwork Reduction Act. The ICR describes the
nature of the information collection and its expected burden. TSA
published a Federal Register notice, with a 60-day comment period
soliciting comments, of the following collection of information on July
18, 2006, 71 FR 40731.

DATES: Send your comments by December 4, 2006. A comment to OMB is most
effective if OMB receives it within 30 days of publication.

ADDRESSES: Interested persons are invited to submit written comments on
the proposed information collection to the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget. Comments should be
addressed to Nathan Lesser, Desk Officer, Department of Homeland
Security/TSA, and sent via electronic mail to
oira_submission@omb.eop.gov or faxed to (202) 395-6974.


FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Katrina Kletzly, Attorney-Advisor,
Office of the Chief Counsel, TSA-2, Transportation Security
Administration, 601 South 12th Street, Arlington, VA 22202-4220;
telephone (571) 227-1995; facsimile (571) 227-1381.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

[[Page 64733]]

Comments Invited

In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C.
3501 et seq.,) an agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is
not required to respond to, a collection of information unless it
displays a valid OMB control number. Therefore, in preparation for OMB
review and approval of the following information collection, TSA is
soliciting comments to--
(1) Evaluate whether the proposed information requirement is
necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency,
including whether the information will have practical utility;
(2) Evaluate the accuracy of the agency's estimate of the burden;
(3) Enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to
be collected; and
(4) Minimize the burden of the collection of information on those
who are to respond, including using appropriate automated, electronic,
mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or other forms
of information technology.

Information Collection Requirement

Title: Registered Traveler Pilot (RT) Pilot Program; Satisfaction
and Effectiveness Measurement Data Collection Instruments.
Type of Request: Extension of a currently approved collection.
OMB Control Number: 1652-0019.
Forms(s): Electronic enrollment application; satisfaction survey.
Affected Public: Applicants to the RT program and lead
stakeholders.
Abstract: TSA is expanding the scope of the Registered Traveler
(RT) Pilot Program, which is currently in operation at one airport and
is already approved by OMB, to test and evaluate specific technologies
and business processes related to the RT concept. In addition, TSA will
add additional locations using the RT Pilot Program's public/private
partnership. Based on information collected from Sponsoring Entities,
TSA will retain enrollment information for purposes of completing and
adjudicating name-based security threat assessments and allow
Sponsoring Entities to issue an RT card to approved applicants. TSA
will also administer two collections to solicit feedback: (1) Customer
satisfaction surveys and (2) stakeholder interviews. For pre-
qualification, TSA will collect information from companies seeking to
participate in the RT program as Service Providers, including
personally identifying information about company key personnel in order
to conduct security threat assessments. Currently, with OMB's approval,
airport authorities or aircraft operators who wish to participate in
the RT program are submitting the suggested Statements of Interest.
Number of Respondents: 744,204.
Estimated Annual Burden Hours: An estimated 236,818 hours annually.
After further evaluation, TSA has adjusted the number of respondents
and estimated annual burden hours reported in its July 18, 2006 notice.

Issued in Arlington, Virginia, on October 30, 2006.
Peter Pietra,
Director of Privacy Policy and Compliance.
[FR Doc. E6-18583 Filed 11-2-06; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 9110-05-P

a glimpse into the future

The Surveillance Society, a look forward.

The public discussion of this document.

TSA estimated wait times

The TSA is trying to educate travelers before the Thanksgiving weekend with a campaign called 3-1-1 on Air Travel." That's three ounces in one zip lock bag and you can carry on ONE bag.

Check out the TSA site for estimated wait-in-line times at your airport. But don't count on it, the TSA won't swear it's a reliable estimate.

SENTRI approved auto tags to cross US-MEX border

Better than a speed pass.

Watch Nightline on November 3rd - How to Survive an Airplane Crash

Upping the Odds, a case study.

SPOT (Screening Passengers by Observational Techniques)

A 2005 study from the Congressional Research Service Folks. See also, the
How to Spot a Terrorist on the Fly article from the Washington Post.

Student publishing boarding pass program gets door kicked in

Bogus Boarding Pass program warrants visit from FBI, ransaked home and warrant taped to his kitchen table. See also, Christopher Soghoian's blog; see also Schneier on security blog; excerpt from his November 2nd posting:

"If you can make a fake boarding pass, you can get through airport security with it. Big deal; we know.

You can also use a fake boarding pass to fly on someone else's ticket. The trick is to have two boarding passes: one legitimate, in the name the reservation is under, and another phony one that matches the name on your photo ID. Use the fake boarding pass in your name to get through airport security, and the real ticket in someone else's name to board the plane.

This means that a terrorist on the no-fly list can get on a plane: He buys a ticket in someone else's name, perhaps using a stolen credit card, and uses his own photo ID and a fake ticket to get through airport security. Since the ticket is in an innocent's name, it won't raise a flag on the no-fly list."