Government / Employer Tracking

Privacy Issues in the Workplace with RFID tracking (being used in RegisteredTraveler).

special lines in Orlando

Exempt from Suspicion.

Verified Identity Pass and Unisys compete for prize

Security Program spreads to Orlando Airport.

getting them off on the right foot

Let them grow up with the habit of being under suveillance.

Mistaken Belief

"Americans believe it's their right to travel without a passport..."

USAToday article on travel to Caribbean.

New rules take effect Dec 31, 2005.

Private Sector Initiatives and RegisteredTraveler

I smell money.:

SAFLINK and Microsoft Join Forces to Deliver Improved Throughput, Economics and Efficiencies for Frequent Travelers


Companies Spearhead a Partnership to Enhance Homeland Security and Traveler
Productivity

BELLEVUE, Wash., May 26 /PRNewswire-FirstCall/ -- SAFLINK(R) Corporation
(Nasdaq: SFLK), a leading developer, marketer, and integrator of security
solutions, today announced SAFLINK is joining with Microsoft (Nasdaq: MSFT) to
spearhead a partnership to solicit interest in a privatized version of the
Registered Traveler program. After meeting with stakeholders, jointly
researching issues, and developing capabilities related to the program for the
past ten months, both organizations are now mobilizing to create a powerful
team to deliver a secure, privacy conscious and financially sensible solution.
"We analyzed the challenge of increasing travel productivity from a host
of different perspectives. We believe our unique and effective solution,
derived from over 30 years of credentialing experience would bring enhanced
security to our nation's airports, while allowing frequent flyers to move
through screening checkpoints faster," remarked Glenn Argenbright, CEO of
SAFLINK. "We are now in the final stages of rounding out the members of our
team, after which we plan to present to the government our proposed solution,"
added Argenbright.
SAFLINK's powerful combination of market-leading biometric and card-based
identity management technologies provides Registered Traveler with an
authentication solution with assurance levels comparable to those employed by
the Department of Defense. These components, coupled with enterprise class
software from Microsoft, and other market-leading partners, offer both the
government and airport executives, a scalable, reliable, and secure framework
for identity assurance and physical access security.
"Microsoft is very focused on homeland security solutions and working with
partners to deploy technology for major DHS initiatives such as Registered
Traveler. Central to Microsoft public sector's mission is working to support
agency mandates to protect citizens and prevent problems before they arise.
Support of this initiative with SAFLINK and other partners, makes a great deal
of sense," said Tom Richey, Microsoft World Wide Director, Homeland Security.
"We fully support the federal government's consideration of a privatized
Registered Traveler program. Privatization not only promises to offer
improved security and efficiency to our nation's air travel, it also promises
to ease the financial burden on taxpayers," continued Richey.
Asa Hutchinson, former Under Secretary for Homeland Security and current
SAFLINK board member, added "This approach allows for government oversight but
eliminates the burden of federal funding of the initiative. It benefits the
key constituents of this issue: the government, travelers and the country's
business community. SAFLINK and Microsoft bring together a powerful
combination of world class security, proven scalability, and enterprise
expertise."
In excess of 280 million trips per year are made as nearly 40 million
frequent travelers move through the nation's airports. The Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) recently announced plans to expand its ongoing
Registered Traveler initiative to evaluate the viability of self-funded
solutions implemented and managed by the private sector. Under the program,
travelers would voluntarily provide basic personal information, along with
biometric data, including a fingerprint or iris scan. Eligible program
participants, having been pre-screened by the TSA, would proceed at the
airport to a biometric security checkpoint designated for registered
travelers. These lines would allow passengers at selected locations to move
through an expedited security screening process.

About SAFLINK
SAFLINK Corporation offers biometric security and smart card solutions
that protect intellectual property, secure information assets, and eliminate
passwords. SAFLINK's Identity Assurance Management(TM) software solutions
allow administrators to verify identity and control access to computer
networks, physical facilities, applications, and time and attendance systems.
Litronic, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of SAFLINK and global provider of
secure identity management and information assurance products for the
government and commercial markets, offers protection for popular applications
such as e-mail, instant messaging, web transactions, and individual files. For
more information, please visit http://www.saflink.com or call 800-762-9595.

NOTE: "SAFLINK" is a registered trademark of SAFLINK Corporation.
"Identity Assurance Management" is a trademark of SAFLINK Corporation.

This release contains information about management's view of the company's
future expectations, plans and prospects that constitute forward-looking
statements for purposes of the safe harbor provisions under The Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Actual results may differ
materially from historical results or those indicated by these forward-looking
statements as a result of a variety of factors including, but not limited to,
risks and uncertainties associated with the company's financial condition, its
ability to sell its products, its ability to compete with competitors and the
growth of the security market, and in its Annual Report on Form 10-K, as well
as other documents periodically filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission.

Contact: Rachel Berry of Sterling Communications, +1-253-853-5030, or
rberry@sterlingpr.com, for SAFLINK; or investor relations, Todd Kehrli of MKR
Group, LLC, +1-818-556-3700, or ir@mkr-group.com, for SAFLINK.


SOURCE SAFLINK Corporation
Web Site: http://www.saflink.com

TSA is good for something

Busting Inebriated Pilots.

8 hour shifts of porn

Backscatter Xray Searches at airports.

your new 64k passport

Popular Science talks about the new passport's vulnerabilities.

Testimony of Michael Chertoff, May 19, 2005

In pertinent part:

"Question: I want to follow up on one of your three areas, that of screening and registered travelers, specifically. As you may know there's going to be a pilot program in Orlando with a private sector company running a registered traveler program. How do you envision in this process the role of the private sector going forward? Is Orlando the beginning of a larger set of private sector initiatives to screen travelers and provide tangible benefits to them? Or do you view that as kind of the traditional -- I guess, with what TSA has done so far in registered travel, or a more traditional government role?

Secretary Chertoff: No, I don't think we necessarily are limited to a traditional government role. There are number of ways in which the private sector can really add value and play a major role in this process. One is, of course, technological -- to the extent we have tools that are more efficient in screening, that's often an area where the private sector contributes.

Second, where we do -- and I want to be very careful about how I say this -- where we do screening, and we do need a certain amount of limited information for screening, some of that's available in the private sector. Now, it may be that it should remain in the private sector, that we don't want the government to accumulate a lot of data, but that we want to figure out a way to deal with the private sector so that we can get a signal or a flag that there is, for example, with respect to a traveler a reason to be concerned without actually having to dive into the underlying data and get access to things that I think people might be reluctant to have their government see. So I actually think the private sector can help us construct an architecture that will be privacy -- pro-privacy and privacy protective, while giving us the ability to see results that will be important in terms of deciding who we have to focus on.

Finally, the private sector can deal with it this way -- you've got a lot of people traveling almost always for private business, as we talk about trusted traveler programs getting more of the kind of information that allows us, for example, to let people move freely through airports, as we talk about biometric types of identification which maybe become available on a voluntary basis, the private sector can create a marketplace for this. If people, in fact, see value in having a biometric card and volunteering some information for it in return for getting some kind of trusted traveler status, that will create a marketplace for the technology and a marketplace for the systems that we need to drive that forward. So that's another area where we look to the private sector.

Question: I wanted to ask another question about collaboration with the private sector in screening, but a different kind of screening, and that is screening for job applicants, for particularly sensitive positions, for example, in critical infrastructure and what your thoughts might be on the practicality, value, and feasibility of screening those applicants against information that the government may have with respect whether it's the NCIC, or eventually if they become reliable enough, some sort of terrorist watch list?

Secretary Chertoff: Well, we have again -- we have pieces of this on the drawing board. There is a TWC program, a transportation workers card, which is designed to deal with people who are going to be transporting hazardous materials. We have; of course, government buildings have various kinds of screening devices. At the end of the day, you -- again, I think you do want to have a capability to screen people who have access to critical material, either when it moves or when it's housed someplace, nuclear power plants, for example. And I think you want to build a capability that has the following aspects -- first of all, that does check against databases that are accurate. And that means not just name databases, but biometric databases so that we can determine if a person, in fact, is secure.

And by the way, you want an ability to update that so that if you get something -- information about a person in year one, and the person -- something happens and they become a terrorist in year eight, you're going to find out about that. And I think you can build that because your platform ultimately is a verifiable card, which has a biometric so that we know a person -- once cleared and once vetted, we know the person who is coming and is in fact the person they say they are. You can do that with fingerprints, for example. You can build into the card an RF chip, or some kind of a capability so that if, in fact, the status changes, you can somehow decommission the card, or you can put a red flag up.

These are technology solutions, but they're really broader. They're system solutions. And in the end if we create this kind of a platform, in theory it could roll out in the transportation area, in the critical infrastructure area, nuclear power plants, government buildings, and if we have it -- although we don't want to merge them necessarily in one database, if there's some interoperability and capability of speaking across the platforms, you might be able to carry a single card that will get you into a courthouse, get you into a government building, and get you into your job and in a minimum of invasion of your privacy and interference with your freedom of movement."

So. . .this is GREAT! Right? We're going to let some yahoo with a gobment contract collect all this data on us and then let that profit driven entity decide whether or not the gobment can use it? Very funny.

change in diversion order

Now you only have to hold it for 15 minutes.

suspect airmen?

17 May 2005
Source: http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/fr-cont.html

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[Federal Register: May 16, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 93)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 25761-25764]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr16my05-2]

=======================================================================
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 61, 63, and 65

[Docket No.: FAA-2003-14293; Amendment Nos. 61-108, 63-32, 65-44]
RIN 2120-AH84


Ineligibility for an Airman Certificate Based on Security Grounds

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Disposition of comments on final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: On January 24, 2003, the FAA adopted eligibility standards
that disqualify a person from holding an airman certificate, rating, or
authorization when the Transportation Security Administration has
advised the FAA in writing that the person poses a security threat. The
rule was adopted to prevent a possible imminent hazard to aircraft,
persons, and property within the United States. This action is a
summary and disposition of comments received on the final rule.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Peter J. Lynch, Enforcement Division,
AGC-300, Office of the Chief Counsel, Federal Aviation Administration,
800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591; Telephone No. (202)
267-3137.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Availability of Rulemaking Documents

You can get an electronic copy using the Internet by:
(1) Searching the Department of Transportation's electronic Docket
Management System (DMS) Web page (http://dms.dot.gov/search); (2) Visiting the Office of Rulemaking's Web page at http://www.faa.gov/avr/arm/index.cfm
; or

(3) Accessing the Government Printing Office's Web page at http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces140.html
.

You can also get a copy by submitting a request to the Federal
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence
Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680. Make
sure to identify the amendment number or docket number of this
rulemaking.
Anyone is able to search the electronic form of all comments
received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual
submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf
of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review DOT's
complete Privacy Act statement in the Federal Register published on
April 11, 2000 (Volume 65, Number 70; Pages 19477-78) or you may visit
http://www.dms.dot.gov.


Background

On January 24, 2003, the FAA published new regulations that
expressly disqualify persons found by the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) to pose a security threat from holding airman
certificates (68 FR 3772). The FAA added new Sec. Sec. 61.18, 63.14
and 65.14 to 14 CFR.
The FAA explained in the final rule that it was relying on threat
assessments made by the TSA based on the broad statutory authority and
responsibility that Congress placed in the TSA when it enacted the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA). ATSA directs the TSA
to receive, assess, and distribute intelligence information related to
transportation security and to assess threats to transportation. It
also charges the TSA with the responsibility to assess intelligence and
other information to identify individuals who pose a threat to
transportation security and to coordinate countermeasures with other
Federal agencies, including the FAA, to address such threats. The law
specifically directs the TSA to establish procedures for notifying the
FAA of the identity of individuals known to pose, or suspected of
posing, a risk of air piracy or terrorism or a threat to airline or
passenger safety.

Congressional Action

Congress has enacted a law that has largely codified the FAA's
rulemaking action. On December 12, 2003, the President signed the
Vision 100--Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act. Section 601 of
that act contained in section 46111 of Title 49 of the U.S. Code
provides, in part:

The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall
issue an order amending, modifying, suspending, or revoking any part
of a certificate issued under this title if the Administrator is
notified by the Under Secretary of Border and Transportation
Security of the Department of Homeland Security that the holder
poses, or is suspected of posing, a risk of air piracy or terrorism
or a threat to airline and passenger safety.

This statute requires the same result as the FAA's rules--if the
Department of Homeland Security notifies the FAA that a certificate
holder poses, or is suspected of posing, a security threat, the FAA
must take action against the certificate. The new law also provides
administrative and judicial review procedures for certificate holders
that are U.S. citizens.

Litigation

Several labor associations and two individuals sought judicial
review of the rules in the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit. The following cases were consolidated for
consideration by the court: Coalition of Airline Pilots Associations v.
FAA and TSA, No. 03-1074, and Air Line Pilots Association,
International, et al. v. FAA and TSA, No. 03-1076. The cases involving
the two individuals were also consolidated: Jifry and Zarie v. FAA and
TSA, No. 03-1085; Jifry and Zarie v. NTSB, Nos. 03-1144 and 03-1282,
which involved certificate action taken by the FAA and reviewed by the
National Transportation Safety Board.
In Jifry and Zarie v. FAA et al., 370 F.3d 1174 (June 11, 2004),
the court addressed the FAA's and TSA's rules as applied to non-
resident aliens. It rejected Jifry and Zarie's challenges to the rule,
including their contentions that the rules were invalid because they
were promulgated without prior notice and violated the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. On February 22,
2005, the Supreme Court declined to review the court of appeals'
decision.
In Coalition of Airline Pilots Associations, et al. v. FAA and TSA,
370 F.3d 1184 (D.C. Cir. June 11, 2004), the court dismissed as moot
the challenge to the FAA's and the TSA's rules posed by several unions
representing aviation workers. The court explained that the new section
46111 directs the FAA to take certificate action when notified by the
Under Secretary of Border and Transportation of a security threat--the
same result that occurred under the FAA's rules. Furthermore, as to
citizens the new law provides a more robust set of procedural
protections than available under the FAA's and the TSA's rules. With
regard to resident aliens, the court noted that the Government had
represented that the agencies would not be enforcing their rules and
would be undertaking notice-and-comment rulemaking.

Summary of Comments

General

The FAA received about 700 comments on the final rule. Most

[[Page 25762]]

commenters opposed the rule. The opposition is mostly based on four
major categories of objections: Due Process; Ineffectiveness against
Terrorists; TSA/Government Will Become Too Powerful; and Adoption of
Rule without Prior Comment.

Due Process

About 300 commenters based their objection to this rule solely on a
perceived due process violation. In total, about 500 commenters cited
due process as a factor in their opposition to this rule. Most seemed
to think that revoking an airman's certificate was similar to a
criminal conviction, and accordingly felt that they were being denied
due process as discussed in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution. One commenter said that the TSA must prove
before a judge that the pilot is a security risk. Several individuals
expressed concerns over the inability to confront their accusers and
see the evidence against them. Many commenters were unhappy about the
lack of an independent appeals process to guarantee that TSA mistakes
and abuses were checked.
The major theme throughout these comments, including those of the
Cessna Aircraft Company and the Independent Pilots' Association, was
that there was no meaningful recourse for a wrongly accused pilot.
Numerous individuals asserted that pilots can make honest mistakes in
interpreting restricted zones, bureaucratic errors can occur, and TSA
officials can spitefully abuse their power, so there must be some sort
of meaningful recourse.
Another major issue raised by numerous commenters was that the
principle of innocent until proven guilty was being violated.
Commenters felt that the TSA should have the burden of proof in all
cases, rather than have the pilot try to prove his or her innocence,
based on evidence he or she might not have access to, in front of a
partial judge, the TSA.
Many commenters also found it unacceptable that the TSA seemed to
be playing multiple roles within the legal system, simultaneously as
accuser, advocate, judge, jury, appellate body, and enforcer. This
issue is related to the third major category, the expansion of
government power, and the potential for abuse of power.
Other commenters recommended that the TSA submit evidence before a
judge to determine whether there is probable cause, based on the
criminal standard, in labeling an individual as a security risk. The
Airline Dispatchers Federation felt that this rule lowers the standard
of proof to hearsay. Some others felt that there were other
Constitutional violations such as an illegal seizure without probable
cause (Fourth Amendment) or lack of a fair trial (Sixth Amendment). In
order to ensure due process, one commenter suggested that the
Department of Homeland Security clear all levels of access for a select
group of individuals to serve as an airman's advocate during an appeal
before the NTSB. Another commenter suggested that there should be a
regional board of review available to each accused pilot.

Ineffective Against Terrorists

About 180 commenters objected to this rule based on the notion that
this rule would not help in our fight against terrorism, which is the
underlying reason for this rule. About 40 commenters objected to this
rule solely based on this type of reasoning. The commenters who made
this point generally felt that since terrorists by nature are not law-
abiding citizens and are quite dedicated to their cause, the lack of
proper certification to fly a plane would not deter their plans. Many
cited the September 11, 2001, attacks as an example of how unlicensed
pilots or even passengers could take control of a plane, without any
official certification. Commenters overwhelmingly felt that revoking a
pilot certificate does not remove the knowledge of how to fly a plane.
Some commenters stated that if the government really did have
evidence proving that an individual is a terrorist, they would hope
that much more could be done. Commenters specifically mentioned
detention and a criminal trial, rather than revoking a pilot
certificate. Commenters felt that revoking a pilot certificate was
meaningless. One commenter felt that if the FAA were to revoke an
airman certificate, it would then lose all power and authority over
that individual. Additionally, several pilots and organizations claimed
that certificates are very rarely checked before one flies an airplane,
and thus it is conceivable that an unlicensed pilot would still be able
to fly a plane. The resounding tone of this type of objection was that
only innocent, law-abiding citizens would be hurt by this rule, and
terrorists would not be affected.

TSA/Government Will Become Too Powerful

Many of the about 170 people who voiced this type of objection felt
that if this rule remains in effect, the terrorists have ultimately
won. They will have forced Americans to give up hard-earned rights to
the government. Numerous individuals echoed concerns of governmental
abuse related to due process based on the view that the TSA seemed to
play numerous roles in the process.
Most commenters also mentioned some loss of freedom. Many felt that
pilots would not be able to freely express their opinions, security-
related and otherwise, because of the fear of being unjustly deemed a
security risk by the TSA. Others felt that, in general, we should not
sacrifice personal freedoms to make up for the government's inability
to do its job.
One of the most pressing concerns of many commenters was that
experienced, professional pilots could be judged by TSA screeners.
Commenters felt the screeners were young, inexperienced, and
unqualified. Many of these commenters were pilots, and were deeply
concerned that a mistake-prone screener or one with a personal vendetta
could ruin their lives. Some commenters stated that government, as an
institution, has many natural advantages over individuals, especially
those accused of being security risks. Commenters felt supplementing
those advantages with this essentially absolute power could forever
punish a wrongly-accused individual. They were concerned that these
individuals would face a tremendous challenge trying to defend
themselves without seeing the evidence or having the ability to cross-
examine witnesses.
The Experimental Aircraft Association and the Airline Professionals
Association/Teamsters Local 1224 demanded a meaningful opportunity for
the accused to be heard. They were very concerned about the inability
of the accused to challenge TSA evidence due to its non-disclosure
rules and autonomy throughout the process. Furthermore, several
commenters were troubled because of their belief that there are no
checks and balances in this rule because there is no oversight or
ability to appeal a TSA decision to another authority. Many of these
individuals and organizations demanded the right to an appeal. They
suggested that a newly created independent review board or the NTSB
oversee the decisions of the TSA, since the TSA has the convenient
ability to shield information under the guise of national security.

Adoption of Rule Without Prior Comment

More than 40 commenters were frustrated by the rulemaking process
for this final rule. The lack of an NPRM

[[Page 25763]]

followed by an opportunity for public comment, before issuing the final
rule, bothered many individuals because they felt that public feedback
was a vital part of the democratic process. Some also questioned the
stated emergency that prevented normal public comment. They pointed out
that this rule was issued more than 16 months after the September 11th
attacks, the event cited in the final rule as the underlying cause for
the rule. Others claimed that this rule would have been revised or
withdrawn had the FAA gone through the normal process.

Miscellaneous Objections

Many commenters worried about both the financial implications for
wrongly accused pilots and for the airline industry, as many pilots, in
their view, could be blacklisted for minor infractions. The Southwest
Airlines Pilots' Association commented that the little evidence the TSA
needs to accuse a pilot could have a large financial impact on the
pilot. One commenter felt that besides the lack of compensation for
wrongly accused ``victims,'' the individual does not have enough time
to make a proper appeal. Another was troubled by the lack of a time
frame for each part of the process.
Several individuals demanded the standards used by the TSA to
determine security risks be clearly and openly stated, to prevent
racial profiling and other forms of abuse by TSA. Many commenters felt
that this rule was disrespectful to pilots and could alienate them.
Among these, many felt that pilots were unfairly being singled out for
extra scrutiny. They pointed out that terrorists could just as easily
seize trucks or ships and could conceivably do more damage with a large
truck than a small plane. They maintain that it would seem absurd to
allow the government to immediately revoke drivers' licenses based on
mere suspicion, and pilots' licenses deserve that same level of
respect. One commenter stated that the lack of a driver's license
hardly prevents many otherwise lawful citizens from driving, yet this
rule unreasonably expects an unlawful citizen to be deterred by
revoking his or her pilot's license. Some pilots felt insulted by this
rule. They said that pilots are often former members of the armed
services, who have risked their lives for America, yet are being
treated like terrorists by their own government. Two commenters said
that this was unfair because pilots of foreign airlines who operate in
American airspace would not be scrutinized as thoroughly as American
pilots, when it should be the other way around.
Some commenters also claim that they are the good guys in the fight
against terrorism, by using their unique vantage point, high in the
air, to help law enforcement officials. Also, one commenter said it was
frustrating that thousands of innocent airmen will be classified as
security risks, when they are the ones most vulnerable to terrorists.
Others joined this sentiment and said that instead of targeting
innocent American aviators, the government should focus its national
security efforts on tighter national borders and better enforced
immigration laws. One commenter felt that pilots were less of a threat
to national security than maintenance workers who have ample access to
the aircraft. One commenter said that it was unconstitutional to allow
secret testimony to be used in any FAA determination. Several
commenters also mentioned that restricted flying zones change so often
that a pilot could make an honest mistake, and without any due process
protections, could lose his or her license to fly, thus deterring many
potential aviators.
Several commenters, including the Aircraft Mechanics Fraternal
Association (AMFA), the Professional Aviation Maintenance Association,
the International Brotherhood of Teamsters Airline Division, and the
American Electronics Association (AEA), claimed that a pilot has
certain property rights associated with his or her pilot certificate
and is constitutionally guaranteed due process before revocation. The
AEA and Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) also mentioned that since
the TSA was not making its criteria for assessing security risks
publicly available, this rule was unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad, and gave the TSA unchecked power. The Transportation Trades
Department pointed out there are no standard criteria for deeming
individuals a security risk, and that there is no independent check on
the TSA at any point in the process.
The AEA also asserted that the FAA did not follow proper procedures
in adopting this rule. ALPA and the Aircraft Owners and Pilots
Association felt that the rule was beyond the scope of the ATSA.
Furthermore, a few individuals and the Aviation Policy Institute
claimed that the FAA already has emergency powers to revoke a pilot's
license, making this rule completely unnecessary. The National Business
Aviation Association and the National Air Transportation Association
would like the FAA to revert to its policies prior to this rule,
feeling that this rule is unnecessary and unconstitutional, because the
FAA already has emergency revocation powers and does not have statutory
authority for this type of rule.
AMFA asserted that certified mechanics already have to go through a
ten-year security background check, and that this new rule would
discriminate against them in favor of non-certified mechanics. Also, a
few commenters expressed concern over the a diminution of the FAA's
role because of this rule, and felt that by giving the TSA the
decision-making authority over the revocation of pilots' licenses, the
FAA was neither fulfilling its mission to oversee aviation safety nor
using its aviation expertise through conducting its own independent
investigations.
Fourteen commenters did not clearly express opposition to this
rule, and their comments were usually either a recommendation to the
FAA or off-topic. Some of the recommendations were that this rule does
not cover: pilots who fly public use aircraft, air traffic controllers,
cleaners, technicians, refuelers, and vendors. One commenter said that
the FAA overlooked the fact that convicted felons can still become
licensed commercial pilots. Another suggested a complete background
check. Two other commenters wanted the courts to step in. One suggested
that a federal court confirm that there is probable cause before the
security risk claim is made by the TSA. The other wanted the Supreme
Court to review the constitutionality of this rule. Finally, one
commenter wondered about the application of this rule to FAA inspectors
and NTSB investigators.

Support for the Rule

Four commenters supported the rule. They felt that this rule is a
worthwhile deterrent in the fight against terrorism because of current
safety concerns. One commenter said that national security is more
important than the possibility of a pilot's losing his or her license
for a period of time. Another emphasized that an airman certificate is
a privilege not a right.
FAA response: Congress has enacted a law that has largely overtaken
the FAA's rulemaking action and the challenges to the FAA's and TSA's
rules have been decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit. Based on these developments, a detailed response
to the comments is not warranted. In addition, many of the comments
addressed the TSA's rules, and it would be inappropriate for the FAA to
address these comments.

[[Page 25764]]

Conclusion

The FAA is working with TSA to determine if additional rulemaking
is necessary to reflect the statutory requirements of 49 U.S.C. 46111.
In this new rulemaking action, the public will have an opportunity to
comment before the adoption of a final rule.

Issued in Washington, DC, on May 10, 2005.
Marion C. Blakey,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 05-9704 Filed 5-13-05; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

suspect airmen

Suspect Airmen.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

[Federal Register: May 16, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 93)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 25761-25764]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr16my05-2]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 61, 63, and 65

[Docket No.: FAA-2003-14293; Amendment Nos. 61-108, 63-32, 65-44]
RIN 2120-AH84


Ineligibility for an Airman Certificate Based on Security Grounds

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Disposition of comments on final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: On January 24, 2003, the FAA adopted eligibility standards
that disqualify a person from holding an airman certificate, rating, or
authorization when the Transportation Security Administration has
advised the FAA in writing that the person poses a security threat. The
rule was adopted to prevent a possible imminent hazard to aircraft,
persons, and property within the United States. This action is a
summary and disposition of comments received on the final rule.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Peter J. Lynch, Enforcement Division,
AGC-300, Office of the Chief Counsel, Federal Aviation Administration,
800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591; Telephone No. (202)
267-3137.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Availability of Rulemaking Documents

You can get an electronic copy using the Internet by:
(1) Searching the Department of Transportation's electronic Docket
Management System (DMS) Web page (http://dms.dot.gov/search); (2) Visiting the Office of Rulemaking's Web page at

Personal Data for the Taking

imagine what they could do with unlimited time. . ..

Your Liberty is Only as Complete as Your Money

Essential Liberty.

Virtual Strip Search

What I want to know is: Can they see inside your vagina? And if NOT, then it is USELESS.

REAL ID ACT and RFID tracking device

Can a Minority Report be far behind?.

What a waste of money. . .

See the GAO's report on the estimated costs of passenger screening.

I feel so much safer with you here

Date: 14 May 2005 10:52:54 -0000


Agents from the Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) division of Homeland Security seized more than
1,300 "high-quality counterfeit" badges from 35 different federal,
state and local law enforcement agencies. Among the fakes nabbed by
ICE are those resembling badges of the FBI, Secret Service, Drug
Enforcement Administration, New York Police Department and even the
Federal Air Marshal Service; the agency assigned to protect
commercial air travel. ICE is asking the PUBLIC to be on the alert
and to report anyone "displaying, using or distributing" phony
badges. Of course, we've all been given training on how to identify these badges. NOT.

Schneier on Security has already done all the heavy lifting

Exhaustive resource on REAL ID and all the problems it CREATES and all the ones it does not SOLVE.

Michael Boyd's Scathing Polemic

For a column that's a hoot, see Michael Boyd's scathing polemic Dated May 9, 2006 about the ludicrous ineptness of Airport Security:

Michael Boyd's Aviation Planning Hot Flash Column.

encrypt identity data or you cannot have it

Encrypt IT.

The government, who are the folks mandating this business, should be stepping up and telling those who collect our identity data that they MUST encrypt it AND that de-encryption and access to the data may ONLY be lawful when the de-encryption password is supplied BY THE CITIZEN DIRECTLY.

beyond elite status, get a black card

Get a Black Card.

Complaining to TSA

Apparently, complaints about the mishandling of baggage and alleged damage to items once in the hands of TSA are so common that the Dept has put up an online claims form:

fill out the form.

routine license check leads to deportation

Under the REAL ID Act, this will become much more common. Could a REAL ID have stopped Tim McVeigh?

routine license check means deportation linked to attorney incompetence.

GAO report

Let's try this again: Findings on the effectivness of TSA Security Screeners from the folks who measure such things:

http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-457

Measuring the performance of TSA Screeners, some sobering findings from the folks who measure such things:

http://www.goa.gov/new.items/d05457.pdf

What is the POINT of using a terrorist list that is INCOMPLETE? Humm? The MOST secret names are not on the list, so those are the folks most likely to slip through the system, no?


http://www.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20050504/1a_lede04_dom.art.htm

an exercise in the absurd

For a hilarious look inside the screening process, see Joel Sharkey's column in the NYTimes for Tuesday, May3, 2005, "Beware FBI agents bearing nail files"


http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/03/business/03road.html

Your papers, please

Congress contemplates National Driver's License ID:

http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/03/politics/03licenses.html